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SPARE THE ROD AND SPOIL THE JUDGE? DISCIPLINE
OF FEDERAL JUDGES AND THE SEPARATION OF
POWERS
Paula Abrams*
He has made judges dependent on his will alone for the tenure of their of-
fices, and the amount and payment of their salaries.'
INTRODUCTION
In 1980, Congress passed the Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial Con-
duct and Disability Act ("Act" or "1980 Act"),' a judicial disciplinary stat-
ute. The 1980 Act empowers federal judges to review and investigate com-
plaints against fellow judges and, where appropriate, impose sanctions,
including the removal of caseloads and private or public reprimands. The Act
does not authorize removal of Article III judges. It does, however, require the
investigating judges to determine whether the judge under investigation may
have engaged in impeachable conduct and to forward such determination to
the House of Representatives.'
The 1980 Act is the product of long-standing congressional efforts to in-
crease the accountability of federal judges. It authorizes substantial judicial-
branch discretion to discipline both minor and serious judicial misconduct. In
fact, the Act was intended to serve as an alternative to impeachment for seri-
ous judicial misconduct.4
The limited political accountability of the federal judiciary has troubled
* Assistant Professor, Northwestern School of Law of Lewis and Clark College, Portland, Ore-
gon. J.D., 1979, University of California at Berkeley (Boalt Hall).
I wish to thank Ed Brunet for his helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article.
1. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 10 (U.S. 1776). British judges in 1776 were not
as vulnerable as colonial judges. Both the salary and tenure of British judges were protected from
interference by the King. See Martha Andes Ziskind, Judicial Tenure in the American Constitu-
tion: English and American Precedents, 1969 SuP. CT. REV. 135, 137 (Framers wanted to balance
King's executive influence in England with states' legislative influence in America); infra text
accompanying note 14.
2. Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-
458, 94 Stat. 2035 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 331, 332, 372, 604 (1988)).
3. Id. Article III judges include the Supreme Court Justices and the judges of the "inferior
Courts" established by Congress (as opposed to Article I "inferior Tribunals"). U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 8, cl.9; U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
4. See infra notes 166-68 and accompanying text (noting that Congress intended the Act to
allow the Judicial Conference to screen and define impeachable conduct).
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scholars, politicians, and the public since the Constitution was ratified. The
dilemma posed by judicial-branch discipline goes to the heart of the tension
between judicial independence and judicial accountability: at what point does
judicial accountability impermissibly undermine judicial independence? In-
deed, one of the paradoxes of our system of government is that limited ac-
countability for the judiciary is the means provided in the Constitution to se-
cure judicial independence.5
The judiciary, as an institution, has an obvious interest in judicial miscon-
duct. Judicial misconduct may jeopardize both the fairness and efficiency of
the judicial process and ultimately threaten the judicial system's credibility.
To what extent may the judiciary therefore participate in the discipline of
judges? The judiciary's strong interest in judicial misconduct suggests that dis-
ciplinary authority should be broad. Separation of powers concerns also sup-
port regulation by the judiciary of judicial misconduct since the Executive and
Congress have limited authority over judicial branch misconduct.'
Two constitutional principles, however, limit the potential scope of judicial
branch disciplinary power: the importance of judicial independence in the
Constitution's framework, and the function of the impeachment power. The
Constitution's mandate of judicial independence limits not only the permissible
scope of judicial disciplinary authority, but also the means by which discipline
is achieved. Although judicial discipline may be a legitimate goal of the judici-
ary, the disciplinary process must not undermine impartial judicial decision-
making. The impeachment function restricts judicial authority to discipline se-
rious judicial misconduct. Impeachment is the one constitutional means availa-
ble to assure accountability of an unelected, life-tenured judiciary. Serious
misconduct should be addressed in a public forum, not in the chambers of the
judiciary.
Additionally, the judiciary's interest in regulating misconduct must be de-
fined precisely and distinguished from executive or legislative interests in judi-
cial discipline. Congress has an interest in assuring public accountability by
impeachment for serious abuses of public offices. The Constitution grants the
executive branch authority to prosecute impeachable offenses that may be
crimes.' The judicial interest in regulating judicial misconduct is not derived
from public accountability, but arises directly from its mandate of assuring a
fair judicial process. Therefore, a judicial-branch disciplinary process that au-
thorizes public accountability for minor misconduct confuses the judiciary's
legitimate administrative needs with the other branches' public accountability
interests in judicial discipline.
5. The Constitution authorizes impeachment for treason, bribery, "or other high Crimes and
Misdemeanors." U.S. CONST. art. It, § 4.
6. See infra text accompanying note 102 (noting that Congress has authority to impeach judges
and the Executive may prosecute a judge who commits a crime).
7. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4; see infra text accompanying note 34 (noting that, in the last 20
years, there have been numerous proposals for constitutional amendments that would allow re-
moval of judges by means other than impeachment).
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This Article examines the constitutional legitimacy of judicial-branch disci-
pline of federal judges, including the disciplinary process established by the
1980 Act, and the Article concludes that the Act is seriously flawed. The Act
authorizes judicial discipline as an alternative to impeachment for serious mis-
conduct. This authority threatens to undermine the values secured by the Con-
stitution's impeachment clause. The Act also impermissibly undermines judi-
cial independence by authorizing public accountability for minor judicial
misconduct.
Section I of this Article discusses the significance of judicial independence
within the Constitution's framework. Judicial independence secures impartial
decision-making, the essential function of the judiciary, and a critical compo-
nent of the separation of powers. Section II traces the development of federal
judicial-branch discipline from its origins in the judicial administration reform
movement. Section III analyzes the scope of constitutionally permissible disci-
plinary power, assesses the legitimacy of removal by means other than im-
peachment and forms of discipline short of removal. The correlation of im-
peachable offenses to misconduct under the 1980 Act is also examined.
Sections IV and V of the Article examine the relationship between judicial
discipline and the separation of powers, and the extreme importance of inde-
pendence to the judiciary. The Article concludes in Section VI with a discus-
sion of the 1980 Act.
I. JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE VERSUs ACCOUNTABILITY
The delegates who met in Philadelphia in May 1787 to revise The Articles
of Confederation envisioned a republic enriched by a truly independent judici-
ary. An independent judiciary serves as a possible check on the excesses of the
executive and legislative branches.' Judicial independence also secures fair and
impartial administration of the laws.9 Alexander Hamilton wrote that an inde-
pendent judiciary is an "excellent barrier to the encroachments and oppres-
sions of the representative body. And it is the best expedient which can be
devised in any government to secure a steady, upright and impartial adminis-
tration of the laws." 10
The Framers' vision of judicial independence had roots both in the English
8. Joseph Story noted that, "[h]aving provided amply for the legislative and executive authori-
ties, [the Framers] established a balance-wheel, which, by its independent structure should adjust
the irregularities, and check the excesses of the occasional movements of the system." JOSEPH
STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION, reprinted in part in 4 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITU-
TION 200, 207 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987).
9. The relationship between judicial independence and justice was well recognized by 1787.
For example, the Delaware Constitution, adopted in September 1776, proclaimed "[tlhat the In-
dependency and Uprightness of Judges are essential to the impartial Administration of Justice,
and a great Security to the Rights and Liberties of the People." DELAWARE DECLARATION OF
RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL RULES § 22. reprinted in 4 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION, supra
note 8, at 132, 132 [hereinafter DELAWARE DECLARATION].
10. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 465 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
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judicial system and in its colonial offspring." Before 1701, English judges
served at the pleasure of the Crown. Judges who displeased the King found
their patents of office revoked.' 2 In 1701 Parliament passed the Act of Settle-
ment,'" which provided that "[jiudges Commissions be made quandiu se bene
gesserint [during good behavior], and their Salaries ascertained and estab-
lished; but upon the Address of both Houses of Parliament it may be lawful to
remove them.""' The Act of Settlement thus made judges less dependent on
the Crown. Judges could nonetheless be removed by Parliament for any rea-
son. Impeachment, firmly established in England during the reign of Henry IV
(1399-1413), was the preferred method for removing judges for misconduct.' 5
Similarly, in the American colonies, judges generally served at the pleasure
of the royal governors. Attempts by several colonial legislatures to limit the
governors' removal power led to the 1761 royal proclamation that judicial ten-
ure in the American colonies be at the pleasure of the Crown.' The depen-
dency of judges upon the will of the King was one of the complaints listed in
the Declaration of Independence.' 7
The delegates to the 1787 Constitutional Convention were familiar with sev-
eral models of judicial tenure and removal. At the time, several states granted
judicial tenure during good behavior. Others limited tenure to a specified term
of years. 8 Most states authorized removal by impeachment for misconduct
while in office. A few states also provided for removal by the governor upon
address of the legislature. 9
The Framers perceived the judiciary as the weakest branch of government.
Hamilton noted that "the natural feebleness of the judiciary [is] in continual
jeopardy of being overpowered, awed, or influenced by its co-ordinate branches
11. Martha Ziskind claims that colonial and state constitutional provisions are more significant
than their English counterparts. Ziskind, supra note 1, at 137-47. In contrast, Professor Raoul
Berger bases much of his interpretation of the impeachment and "good behavior" clauses on En-
glish precedent. See RAOUL BERGER, IMPEACHMENT: THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS 159-65
(1973).
12. The dismissal of Sir Edward Coke by James I in 1616 is probably the best known example.
Coke was dismissed for refusing to consult with the King before deciding a case and for refusing
to concede that such consultation was required. John D. Feerick, Impeaching Federal Judges: A
Study of the Constitutional Provisions, 39 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 10 (1970). The writ of scire
facias was used to revoke a patent of office "after a determination was made that the holder had
breached the condition upon which he held office, e.g. good behavior." Id. at It n.54.
13. Act of Settlement, 1701, 12 & 13 Will. 3, ch. 2 (Eng.).
14. Id.
15. See Ziskind, supra note 1, at 137.
16. Sam J. Ervin, Separation of Powers: Judicial Independence, 35 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
108, 112 (1970).
17. Ziskind. supra note I and accompanying text.
18. Delaware, New York, Maryland, and Virginia were some of the early states granting
judges tenure during good behavior. New Jersey provided for seven-year terms. Pennsylvania
started out with seven-year terms but shifted to a good behavior standard in 1790. See Ziskind,
supra note I, at 140-44.
19. An address is analogous to a joint resolution. Feerick, supra note 12, at 15.
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[of government].""0 The Framers believed that the proper functioning of the
judiciary could only be secured through a constitutional structure designed to
protect judicial independence. The cornerstones of this structure are the con-
stitutional guarantees of tenure during good behavior and the protection from
diminution of salary.21 Hamilton proclaimed the importance of guaranteed
tenure to the protection of judicial independence in the Federalist Papers:
[As] nothing can contribute so much to [the judiciary's] firmness and inde-
pendence as permanency in office, this quality may therefore be justly re-
garded as an indispensable ingredient in its constitution, and, in a great
measure, as the citadel of the public justice and the public security."
Periodic appointments could not sufficiently secure independence because:
If the power of making them was committed either to the executive or legis-
lature there would be danger of an improper complaisance to the branch
which possessed it; if to both, there would be an unwillingness to hazard the
displeasure of either; if to the people, or to persons chosen by them for the
special purpose, there would be too great a disposition to consult popularity
to justify a reliance that nothing would be consulted but the Constitution
and the laws. 3
For similar reasons, the-judiciary needed protection against arbitrary or "at
will" removal. The Framers overwhelmingly rejected a proposal providing for
removal by the Executive upon address of both Houses of Congress because it
would unacceptably weaken the independence of judges. '
The protection of judges from diminution in salary was adopted in Article
20. THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 10, at 466. The Framers con-
sidered the legislature to be the most powerful branch of government. At the Constitutional Con-
vention, Madison commented that "experience in all States has evinced a powerful tendency in the
legislature to absorb all power into its vortex." Ziskind, supra note 1, at 144 (quoting FLETCHER
M. GREEN, CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC STATES, 1776-1860, at 25
(1930)).
21. "The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good
Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services a Compensation which shall not
be diminished during their Continuance in Office." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
22. THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 10, at 466. Thomas Jefferson,
who later came to believe the judges were too independent, first argued that "[t]he judges ...
should not be dependent upon any man or body of men." Merrill E. Otis, A Proposed Tribunal: Is
It Constitutional?, 7 U. KAN. CITY L. REV. 3, 6 (1938).
23. THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 10, at 471. At the Pennsylvania
Ratifying Convention, James Wilson noted complaints that the "independence of the judges is not
properly secured" were frequently voiced in Pennsylvania. Debate in Pennsylvania Ratifying Con-
vention, in 4 THE FOUNDER'S CONSTITUTION, supra note 8 at 139, 139 (emphasis omitted). In
states where appointment had been for less than good behavior, Wilson noted that independence
had not been adequately protected. He commented, "It may appear too professional to descend
into observations of this kind; but I believe that public happiness, personal liberty, and private
property depend essentially upon the able and upright determination of independent judges." Id.
24. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 428-29 (Max Farrand ed., rev.
ed. 1937) [hereinafter CONVENTION RECORDS]: infra text accompanying note I 1l (noting that the
Framers referred to the offices of the judiciary department as continuing "for life").
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III of the Constitution as an additional means to secure the independence of
the judiciary from Congress. Moreover, James Madison worried that allowing
Congress the authority to increase judicial compensation would render judges
too dependent upon the legislature.25 Hamilton wrote:
Next to permanency in office, nothing can contribute more to the indepen-
dence of the judges than a fixed provision for their support . . . . In the
general course of human nature, a power over a man's subsistence amounts
to a power over his will. And we can never hope to see realized in practice
the complete separation of the judicial from the legislative power, in any
system which leaves the former dependent for pecuniary resources on the
occasional grants of the latter.26
The passage of time has not diminished the significance of an independent
judiciary to impartial decision-making. Impartial decision-making can be
achieved only by freedom from political pressures. Political independence is
particularly critical when the judiciary is called upon to assess the constitu-
tionality of actions by the other branches of government.27 Justice Felix
Frankfurter wrote that "[c]ourts are not representative bodies. They are not
designed to be a good reflex of a democratic society." '2' The justification for
protecting judicial independence is apparent in the role that courts play in
articulating governmental responsibilities and individual rights. Federal court
calendars read like a compendium of the most sensitive political issues of our
times. Judges must be free to decide these issues without fear of retribution or
hope of favor for their judgments.
Analysis of the constitutionally permissible scope of judicial discipline must
take into account the priority placed by the Framers on judicial independence.
Experience taught the Framers the dangers of a judiciary beholden to its coor-
dinate branches. In the legislative and executive branches, political accounta-
bility could be expected to secure efficient operations and assure the integrity
of public officials. By contrast, the Framers believed that independence, not
accountability, was the best means of ensuring an effective judiciary free from
corruption by political pressures. To this end, the Framers intended to provide
for limited judicial accountability. The impeachment clause affords protection
25. Records of the Federal Convention, in THE FOUNDER'S CONSTITUTION, supra note 8, at
133, 137. Madison was not alone in voicing this concern. The Virginia Plan proposed by Edmund
Randolph initially provided that the judges receive compensation "in which no increase or diminu-
tion shall be made." 1 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 24, at 21-22. However, Governor Mor-
ris moved to strike the phrase "or increase" from the Plan, arguing that this was necessary to
attract quality candidates to the bench. The motion passed 6-2. See Records of the Federal Con-
vention, supra, at 137.
26. THE FEDERALIST No. 79 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 10, at 472.
27. Hamilton argued that "Itihe complete independence of the courts of justice is peculiarly
essential in a limited constitution" because the judiciary is responsible for preserving the constitu-
tional limitations. THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 10, at 466.
28. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S 494, 525 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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against criminal or corrupt judicial conduct. Greater accountability was re-
jected by the Framers because it would subvert the very goals safeguarded by
independence.
The Congress and judiciary of 1789 are a far cry from their modern-day
counterparts.29 Today there are over 730 federal judges.30 The daily crush of
business of the Congress has led some observers to conclude that impeachment
is such a "cumbersome" process that the judiciary is rendered effectively un-
accountable for its conduct.31 The Watergate scandal reinforced a general dis-
trust of government institutions, and undoubtedly has contributed to demands
for increased governmental accountability.3 2 In addition, as the judiciary has
become increasingly prominent in deciding social issues, the public increas-
ingly has viewed judges as political officials who should be held accountable
for their decisions.3 3
Since the early 1970s, the quest for increased accountability engendered
proposals for constitutional amendments allowing removal of judges by means
other than impeachment and increased demands for discipline short of im-
peachment.3 These proposals are the latest innovations in a long history of
attempts to impose greater accountability upon the federal judiciary.
29. See infra note 42 (describing significant increases in caseloads in courts of appeals since
1891).
30. Robert W. Kastenmeier & Michael J. Remington, Judicial Discipline: A Legislative Per-
spective, 76 Ky. L.J. 763, 780 (1988).
31. Senator Dennis DeConcini, in 1978, while Chairman of the Subcommittee on Improve-
ments in Judicial Machinery, said "this cumbersome procedure is only viable with respect to the
Presidency and the Supreme Court." Edward D. Re, Judicial Independence and Accountability:
The Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980, 8 N. Ky. L.R.
221, 230-31 (1981). Since that time, Congress has impeached and convicted three federal judges:
Harry Claiborne, Alcee Hastings, and Walter F. Nixon.
32. Senator Deconcini remarked that "the American people have replaced respect for public
officials with tolerance" and claimed that there is a "need to restore public confidence in our
institutions." Id.
33. The recall of Chief Justice Rose Byrd and other California Supreme Court justices for their
"liberal" views exemplifies the perception that judges are political officials who should be selected
for their views on particular issues. See generally Irving R. Kaufman, Chilling Judicial Indepen-
dence, 88 YALE L.J. 681 (1979) (stating that recent judicial removal practices destroy the inde-
pendence created by the Framers who relied upon the impeachment process for disciplinary pur-
poses); Larry G. Simon, The Supreme Court's Independence: Accountability, Majoritarianism
and Justification. Comments on Seidman, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1607, 1615 (1988) (commenting
that Seidman's proposal of electing Supreme Court Justices creates as many problems as it
solves).
34. House of Representatives Joint Resolution 454 is an example of one of the more recent
attempts to amend the Constitution. The resolution proposed an amendment providing that "The
Congress may by law provide that the Supreme Court may remove from office any judge of a
court ordained and established under article II of this Constitution, if the Supreme Court deter-
mines that such judge has been convicted in a Federal court of a criminal offense." H.R.J. Res.
454, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CONG. REC. H9713 (daily ed. Nov. 21, 1989). The resolution
responded to Judge Claiborne's conviction and imprisonment for tax fraud before Congress got
around to impeachment proceedings.
1991]
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
II. HISTORY OF JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE
A. Background
Judicial independence has been subject to attack almost from the time the
Constitution was ratified. The first constitutional amendment to provide a stat-
utory alternative to removal by impeachment was proposed in Congress in
1791.1' In 1803, Thomas Jefferson instigated a movement to use impeachment
to remove Federalist judges from the bench and replace them with Republican
judges. When the Senate failed to convict Supreme Court Justice Samuel
Chase in 1805, Congress again debated alternatives to impeachment. Between
1807 and 1812, Congress considered no less than nine such proposed alterna-
tives.36 During the early twentieth century, the populist movement tried to
increase the political accountability of federal judges through proposals to
change the selection process and limit judicial power and jurisdiction.3 7 The
impeachment and removal of Judge Halstead Ritter in 1936 provoked a new
round of congressional efforts to establish statutory alternatives to impeach-
ment. President Roosevelt's "court-packing" plan of 1937 briefly shifted con-
gressional attention to the defense of judicial independence. By 1939, however,
Congress returned its focus to increasing judicial accountability. 8
These congressional proposals shared a common feature: Each was intended
to increase the political accountability of federal judges by establishing means
of removal other than impeachment.39 None was successful because Congress
was concerned that legislative alternatives to impeachment were unconstitu-
tional, and Congress could not be convinced that it was wise to amend the
Constitution to facilitate removal of federal judges.40 At the time, little atten-
35. See AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY RESEARCH, JUDICIAL DiscI-
PLINE AND TENURE PROPOSALS 3 (1979) [hereinafter JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE AND TENURE PROPOS-
ALS]. The First Congress provided in Section 21 of the Act of April 30, 1790, that a judge con-
victed of accepting a bribe "shall forever be disqualified to hold any office of honor, trust or profit
under the United States." Id.
36. See id.
37. See PETER G. FISH, THE POLITICS OF FEDERAL JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 18 (1973).
38. See RUSSEL R. WHEELER & A. LEO LEVIN, JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE AND REMOVAL IN THE
UNITED STATES 20 (1979).
39. The impeachment clauses are the only constitutional provisions that explicitly authorize the
discipline of federal judges. Article II, § 4 provides, "The President, Vice President and all civil
Officers of the United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction
of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors." U.S. CONST. art II, § 4. Judges
are "civil officers" for purposes of the impeachment clause. See Kaufman, supra note 33, at 691
(citing dictum in Shurtleff v. United States, 189 U.S. 311, 316 (1903)). The House "shall have
the sole Power of Impeachment" and the Senate the "sole Power to try all Impeachments". U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5; U.S. CONST. art I, § 3, cl. 6. Conviction following impeachment requires
"the Concurrence of two thirds of the Members present." The only sanctions provided are removal
and disqualification from ever holding federal office. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 7. The party
convicted "shall nevertheless be liable and subject to indictment, Trial, Judgment and Punishment
according to Law." Id. The presidential pardon power does not extend to cases of impeachment.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
40. See Re, supra note 31, at 231-42.
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tion was paid to discipline by means other than removal from office.4 1
While Congress debated judicial accountability, a parallel development was
occurring in the administration of courts that would have a significant effect
on this debate. In the beginning of the twentieth century, a vigorous drive to
improve the administration of the court system began. As America was trans-
forming from a predominantly rural society into an urban one, the structure of
the court system also changed. The lone circuit rider was replaced by multi-
judge metropolitan courts. The caseload of the courts also increased substan-
tially.42 In 1906 Dean Roscoe Pound delivered an address to the annual meet-
ing of the American Bar Association, urging that significant attention be paid
to the management of the courts in order to bring greater efficiency and jus-
tice to the judicial system. 3 Pound contended that cumbersome procedures
and inefficient judicial administration delayed and ultimately denied justice.
One way to assure greater accountability, he suggested, was to impose rules
for administering judicial business. Pound argued that "[p]ublic opinion must
affect the administration of justice through the rules by which justice is ad-
ministered rather than through the direct administration."" Pound's address
has shaped the parameters of court reform to this day. In the eyes of many
court reformers, judicial independence became an excuse used by headstrong
judges to justify their opposition to management restraints. 5 In fact, the court
reformers viewed mismanagement as a primary threat to judicial indepen-
dence . 6 The reformers touted a "hierarchically organized and tightly adminis-
41. Congressional attention to greater judicial accountability coincided with similar overtures in
the state legislatures. The first part of the 19th century saw significant efforts to limit state judges
to fixed terms and, later, to require popular election. These changes were sought to make judges
more responsive to public opinion in their decision-making. By the beginning of the 20th century,
the pendulum in the states had swung toward independence. Early court reformers, troubled by
the effects of partisan politics on judicial independence, tried to improve the selection process and
tenure of state judges so as to better protect independence. See WHEELER & LEVIN, supra note
38, at 14-15. One of the most esteemed proposals was the "Missouri Plan," which provided for the
establishment of state "merit selection" boards to submit recommendations of meritorious candi-
dates to the appointing authority (generally the governor). See Dorothy W. Nelson, Variations on
a Theme-Selection and Tenure of Judges, 36 S. CAL. L. REV. 4, 41-46, (1962). Despite these
efforts, political accountability through popular election remained the prevailing policy in most
states. Id.
42. This trend has continued. In 1891, the first year of the federal courts of appeals, a total of
841 cases were filed. In 1988, 37,524 cases were filed in the federal courts of appeals. The federal
district courts also have experienced significant caseload increases. Between 1904 (the first year in
which district court filing statistics are available) and 1988, filings have increased from 33,376 to
approximately 285,000. Case filing increases have outpaced the increases in federal judges. See I
FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE, PAPERS AND SUBCOMMITTEE REPORTS 24-31 (July 1,
1990).
43. Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice,
20 J. AM. JUD. Soc'Y 178 (1937).
44. Id. at 180.
45. See ERNEST C. FRIESEN, JR. ET AL., MANAGING THE COURTS 3-4 (1971).
46. Id. at 5-7 (noting that the court system's inability to efficiently manage itself has resulted in
other branches of government asserting financial and administrative control over the courts).
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tered unified court system."4 Reformers also assumed that an integral compo-
nent of centralized management would be institutionalized judicial disciplinary
authority. The Model Judicial Act, proposed by the American Judicature So-
ciety in 1917, provided for a judicial council with the power to remove from
office any judge (other than the chief judge), to reprove (publicly or privately)
or transfer any judge for "inefficiency, incompetence, neglect of duty, lack of
judicial temperament, or conduct unbecoming a gentleman and a judge." '
This "model" implicitly assumed that, once the judiciary was organized in a
traditional bureaucratic hierarchy, discipline would be an appropriate function
of management. Self-regulation was viewed as a desirable alternative to legis-
lative interference.49 Although the Model Judicial Act underwent several
transformations, it consistently retained the notion that the judiciary should
tend to the misconduct or incapacity of its own. 50
The federal judicial system began to transform into a judicial bureaucracy
in 1922 when Congress established the Judicial Conference, a body comprised
of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the chief judge from each
circuit. The Conference was charged with improving the administration and
operations of the federal courts.51 It is authorized to prepare court rules for
the operation of the federal system, including temporary re-assignment of
judges, to prepare and comment on legislation affecting the courts and to sub-
mit suggestions to the various courts "to promote uniformity of management
47. WHEELER & LEVIN, supra note 38, at 17. This proposal was consistent with the general
fervor for unifying and streamlining government. In 1912, President Taft's Commission on Econ-
omy and Efficiency proposed "the integration of all administrative agencies of the Government ...
into a unified organization for the most effective and economical dispatch of public business."
FISH, supra note 37, at 20. Chief Justice Taft, in fact, was one of the leading proponents of an
integrated and centralized judiciary. Id. at 24-25.
48. WHEELER & LEVIN, supra note 38, at 17 (recommending that a judicial council was prefer-
able to relying on the legislature in handling administrative matters concerning errant or incapaci-
tated judges).
49. Id.
50. This thread was taken up by the states in revising their court systems. In 1947 New Jersey
amended its constitution to revise its article on the judiciary and establish a new unified court
system that became a model for court reform throughout the country. The New Jersey "plan"
established a state-wide managerial court organization under the authority of the chief justice of
the New Jersey Supreme Court. The New Jersey Supreme Court made the American Bar Associ-
ation Canons of Judicial Ethics binding on judges and used its Bar disciplinary authority to disci-
pline judges. The New Jersey experience further contributed to the belief that the judiciary should
be responsible for discipline of judges. Today 47 states and the District of Columbia have created
discipline systems that provide for discipline and removal either by a judicial branch or an inde-
pendent commission. Most of these states established disciplinary authority by constitutional
amendment. See id. at 20-21; see also FRIESEN ET AL., supra note 45, at 34-35 (noting that the
New Jersey Constitution gives the state supreme court the authority to make rules governing the
administration of all courts of the state).
51. Congress established the Judicial Conference of Senior Circuit Judges in 1922. Act of Sept.
14, 1922, ch. 306, § 2, 42 Stat. 837-39 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 331 (1988)). Cur-
rently, the Conference is named the Judicial Conference of the United States and includes a




procedures and the expeditious conduct of court business."52
The federal judicial reaction to the creation of the Conference was mixed.
Since the Conference lacked authority to mandate change, compliance with
Conference "suggestions" was erratic." The Chief Justice relied upon "ap-
peals to the conscience" to pressure recalcitrant judges. Indeed, Chief Justice
William Taft characterized the power of the Conference as one which brought
"all the district judges within a mild disciplinary circle." ' 4
President Roosevelt presented the court reorganization plan of 1937 as a
populist reform measure aimed at eradicating "the growing impression that
the courts are chiefly a haven for the well-to-do." 55 Roosevelt explicitly sought
to impose upon the judiciary the "same kind of reorganization ... as has been
recommended ... for the Executive Branch of the Government. 56 Roosevelt's
plan included a proposal for a federal proctor to monitor judicial efficiency and
expose "laggard judges. '5 7 Federal judges, alarmed at such proposals, acted to
devise their own plan for administrative reform. The Administrative Office Act
of 193958 responded to Roosevelt's failed proposal.
The Administrative Office Act of 1939 fundamentally changed federal judi-
cial administration. Previously, federal judicial administration was decentral-
ized, with each district judge responsible for court management within the
district. The 1939 Act created an umbrella administrative agency, the Admin-
istrative Office of the United States Courts, and a judicial council in each
circuit to improve caseload management. The early judicial councils were
comprised of the members of the circuit courts of appeals.5 9 Each judicial
council was charged with making "all necessary and appropriate orders for the
effective and expeditious administration of the justice within its circuit." 60 All
judicial officers and employees of the circuit, including the district courts, were
to "promptly carry into effect all orders of the judicial council."' These broad
grants of responsibility and authority vested the councils with substantial
power. Congress contemplated that the councils would use these powers to re-
52. 28 U.S.C. § 331 (1988). This current statutory language has changed little from the origi-
nal terminology.
53. FISH, supra note 37, at 88-90.
54. Id. at 90 (quoting William Howard Taft, Memorandum to Robert A. Taft (Oct. 2, 1927)
(manuscript on file with the Library of Congress, Washington D.C)).
55. Id. at 115 (quoting 6 THE PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT
52 (1936)).
56. Id. (quoting 6 THE PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS: FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 35
(1936)).
57. Id. at 119 (quoting Judge William Denman, Hearings on S. 1392, at 482 (1937), before the
Senate Committee on the Judiciary).
58. Pub. L. No. 76-299, 53 Stat. 1223 (1939) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 601-611
(1988)).
59. The 1980 Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act altered the
composition of the judicial councils by including the participation of representative district court
judges. 28 U.S.C. § 332(a)(1)(C) (1988).
60. Id. 99 601-611.
61. Id. 9 332(d)(2).
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assign judges to improve case-flow, address backlog problems, order judges to
decide cases held too long under advisement, and set standards of judicial eth-
ics. 2 Congress also intended the councils to attend to the judiciary's business
"in its broader or institutional sense, such as preventing ... any stigma, disre-
pute, or other element of loss of public confidence."6
The extent to which the councils were authorized to discipline or coerce
compliance was unclear and initially was a matter of substantial controversy.
By the 1950s, however, the councils' broad mandate to attend to the "business
of the courts" was widely accepted as including authority to deal with inappro-
priate judicial conduct. The councils entertained complaints alleging disability
or unethical or criminal misconduct. 4 The councils had the authority to order
a judge to take corrective action, but they were without the authority to im-
pose sanctions for failure to comply.6" The councils instead relied upon a
judge's respect for the law to obtain voluntary compliance with its orders. 66
Many judges, however, questioned whether reliance upon such voluntary com-
pliance was adequate.67
The institution of significant management reform eliminated much of the
administrative autonomy of the federal courts. The judiciary's acceptance of
such a change was perhaps more politically astute than may be initially obvi-
ous. The judiciary was able to appease public opinion through reforms aimed
at improving the administration of justice and thereby diffuse more drastic
reform efforts that would have struck more closely at substantive judicial
authority.
The scope of the councils' coercive powers became an active issue in Chan-
dler v. Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit.6" Judge Stephen Chandler was
Chief Judge of the United States District Court for the Western District of
Oklahoma. Judge Chandler frequently clashed with the Judicial Council of the
Tenth Circuit regarding backlogs in his docket, his failure to disqualify him-
self in the face of claims of bias, and his personal involvement as a defendant
in lawsuits. In December 1965, the council, relying upon its power to issue
"1orders for the effective and expeditious administration of justice within its
circuit," 69 ordered that Judge Chandler take no further action in pending
62. Peter G. Fish, The Circuit Councils: Rusty Hinges of Federal Judicial Administration, 37
U. CHI. L. REV. 203, 207 (1970).
63. Id. at 214 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 201, 87th Cong., Ist Sess. 7 (1961)).
64. FISH, supra note 37, at 401.
65. The councils were given the power to certify the permanent mental or physical disability of
a district or circuit judge who refused to retire. If a majority of the circuit court certifies disabil-
ity, the President is authorized by statute to appoint a new judge who will be senior in position to
the disabled judge. The disabled judge receives full salary. 28 U.S.C. § 372(b). This provision has
rarely been invoked. Most disabled judges resign voluntarily.
66. Testimony before the House on the Act of 1939 by various federal judges emphasized the
effectiveness of coercion through persuasion and peer pressure rather than sanctions. See FISH,
supra note 37, at 209.
67. Id. at 420.
68. 398 U.S. 74 (1970).
69. 28 U.S.C. § 332(d)(1).
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cases and that no new cases be assigned him until otherwise ordered. 70
Judge Chandler sought leave before the Supreme Court to file a writ chal-
lenging the order, alleging that the council's action "usurped the impeachment
power" committed to Congress by the Constitution. 71 Chief Justice Burger,
writing for the majority, questioned whether the council's action was review-
able by the Court. But the Court failed to decide this jurisdictional issue; in-
stead, it concluded that Judge Chandler had not made a case for the "ex-
traordinary relief of mandamus or prohibition."" The Court recognized that
the "ultimate question on which review [was] sought" was whether the coun-
cil's action crossed the line of "maximum permissible intervention consistent
with the constitutional requirement of judicial independence."73 The Court
also acknowledged that there can "be no disagreement among us as to the
imperative need for total and absolute independence of judges in deciding
cases or in any phase of the decisional function."7
At the same time, however, the Court recognized the judiciary's need to
establish administrative standards governing the assignment and disposition of
cases. The Court suggested that the councils may have the power to coerce
action because "if one judge in any system refuses to abide by such reasonable
procedures it can hardly be that the extraordinary machinery of impeachment
is the only recourse."75 The failure of the Chandler majority to consider the
permissible reach of council authority contributed additional confusion and
uncertainty to the judicial discipline debate.
Justices Douglas7" and Black dissented, 77 arguing that the constitutional
guarantee of independence protects a federal judge from censorship by fellow
judges. Justice Douglas argued that the umbrella of "administrative over-
sight"78 could serve as an excuse to keep a particular judge from hearing a
particular kind of case. 9 Justice Douglas urged:
It is time that an end be put to these efforts of federal judges to ride herd
on other federal judges. This is a form of hazing having no place under the
Constitution. Federal judges are entitled, like other people, to the full free-
dom of the First Amendment. If they break a law, they can be prosecuted.
If they become corrupt or sit in cases in which they have a personal or
family stake, they can be impeached by Congress. But I search the Consti-
tution in vain for any power of surveillance that other federal judges have
over those aberrations. Some of the idiosyncrasies may be displeasing to
those who walk in more measured, conservative steps. But those idiosyncra-
70. Chandler, 398 U.S. at 78.
71. Id. at 82.
72. Id. at 89.
73. Id. at 84.
74. Id. (dictum).
75. Id. at 85 (dictum).
76. Id. at 129 (Douglas, J. dissenting).
77. Id. at 141 (Black, J., dissenting).
78. Id. at 136 (Douglas, J. dissenting).
79. Id. at 137.
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cies can be of no possible constitutional concern to other federal judges."
The Court's failure to resolve the "liveliest, most controversial contest in-
volving a federal judge in modern United States history" ' caught the atten-
tion of Congress. Once again, the debate on judicial accountability echoed in
the congressional halls. Senator Sam Nunn, responding to the Chandler deci-
sion in the era of Watergate, introduced a federal discipline proposal in 1974
modeled on state judicial conduct commission legislation that authorized re-
moval by the Judicial Conference for misconduct.8 2 Controversy over vesting
removal authority in an entity other than Congress led to numerous revisions
of the proposal.83
B. The 1980 Act
In 1980, Congress passed the Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial Con-
duct and Disability Act,84 a compromise measure that authorizes the disci-
pline, but not the removal, of federal judges. The 1980 Act enhances the pow-
ers of the judicial councils and the Judicial Conference by granting them
specific authority to sanction and discipline all federal judges, excluding Su-
preme Court Justices. 5 This expanded authority is carefully framed in the
context of improving judicial administration. The Act provides that "[a]ny
person" may file a written complaint alleging that a judge "has engaged in
80. Id. at 140-41.
81. Id. at 130.
82. The proposal provided for the establishment of a commission empowered to investigate,
charge, and try judges, and to recommend removal to the Judicial Conference. After modifica-
tions, the Judicial Tenure Act was reintroduced in 1977 in the 95th Congress, co-sponsored by
Senators Nunn and DeConcini. See S. 1423, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
83. The Judicial Conference initially supported the Nunn proposal "in principle." Stephen B.
Burbank, Procedural Rulemaking Under the Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and
Disability Act of 1980, 131 U. PENN. L. REV. 283, 293 & n.32 (1982). Concerns over removal
authority eventually led the Conference to go on record disapproving any legislation authorizing
removal by means other than impeachment. Id. at 293 n.33. The Conference proposed that the
authority of the judicial Councils be increased to encompass more formal disciplinary power. Id.
at 294 n.37.
84. Pub. L. No. 96-458, 94 Stat. 2035 (1980).
85. H.R. REP. No. 1313, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 n.28 (1980). The legislative history provides
an interesting insight on this exclusion. The House Report comments:
There are two reasons for this intentional exclusion. First, high public visibility of
Supreme Court Justices makes it for [far] more likely that impeachment can and
should be used to cure egregious situations. Second, it would be unwise to empower an
institution such as the Judicial Conference, which actually is chaired by the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court, to sit on cases involving the highest ranking judges in
our judicial system. The independence and importance of the Supreme Court within
our justice system should not be diluted in this fashion.
Id.
The report does not explain why the independence of other federal judges may be so diluted.
The Constitution makes no distinctions between the power and prestige of the Supreme Court and
the rest of the federal judiciary.
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conduct prejudicial to the effective and expeditious administration of the busi-
ness of the courts."8 The chief judge of the circuit reviews the complaint.8
The chief judge may dismiss the complaint if it does not meet the statutory
requirements, if it relates directly to the merits of a decision, or if it is frivo-
lous. 8 The chief judge also has the authority to informally dispose of a com-
plaint "if he finds that appropriate corrective action has been taken." 89
The complainant or the judge may petition the judicial council of the circuit
for review of any action by the chief judge under this section.90 If the com-
plaint is not dismissed or handled informally, the chief judge must appoint a
special committee consisting of the chief judge and equal numbers of circuit
and district judges of the circuit to investigate the complaint and submit its
report and recommendation to the judicial council of the circuit.9' The council
may conduct any further investigation it considers necessary and "shall take
such action as is appropriate to assure the effective and expeditious adminis-
tration of the business of the courts within the circuit." 9 The council's author-
ity includes, but is not limited to, ordering that no new cases be assigned the
judge for a temporary period, issuing a public or private reprimand, certifying
the disability of the judge, requesting that the judge retire, or issuing any
other appropriate order.93 Removal of an Article III judge is expressly prohib-
ited.94 The complainant or the judge may petition the Judicial Conference for
review of the action taken by the judicial council.95
The judicial council also has broad discretion to defer action and refer the
complaint to the Judicial Conference for further consideration. The judicial
council must refer the complaint to the Judicial Conference if it determines
that an Article III judge has engaged in conduct "which might constitute one
or more grounds for impeachment under Article II of the Constitution ... [or]
which, in the interest of justice, is not amenable to resolution by the judicial
council."' 97 The Judicial Conference is authorized to investigate the complaint
and take appropriate action. 98 The Conference is required to determine
whether impeachable conduct may be involved and forward its conclusion to
86. 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(1) (1988).
87. See id. § 372(c).
88. Id. § 372(c)(3)(A).
89. Id. § 372(c)(3)(B).
90. Id. § 372(c)(10).
91. Id. § 372(c)(4)-(5).
92. Id. § 372(c)(6).
93. Id.
94. Id. § 372 (c)(6)(B)(vii)(I). Magistrates and bankruptcy judges may be removed pursuant
to procedures established in the Act. Id.
95. Id. § 372(c)(10).
96. Id. § 372(c)(7)(A).
97. Id. § 372(c)(7)(B). The Act provides no guidance on how the judicial council is to deter-
mine whether or not the judge engaged in conduct which "might" be an impeachable offense. See
infra Section III for a discussion of the problems with the judiciary deciding what may be an
impeachable offense.
98. 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(8) (1988).
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the House of Representatives.99 All orders, including denials of petitions for
review, are considered final, and judicial review is not available. 100
The Act vests the councils and the Judicial Conference with virtually unlim-
ited discretion to discipline federal judges as long as they do not order re-
moval. Jurisdiction over. serious judicial misconduct is authorized if the con-
duct is "prejudicial to the effective and expeditious administration of the
business of the courts."101 Judicial discipline of serious misconduct poses a
threat, however, both to judicial independence and to the impeachment
function.
III. THE PERMISSIBLE SCOPE OF DISCIPLINARY POWER
A. Removal By Means Other Than Impeachment
Impeachment is not the only sanction authorized by the Constitution for
judicial misconduct. A judge who commits a crime may be prosecuted, con-
victed, and incarcerated just like any other criminal." 2 A judge may even be
prosecuted and incarcerated prior to impeachment. 03 Considerable contro-
versy has centered on whether the Constitution permits other forms of sanc-
tions against judges, including removal by means other than impeachment.0 4
99. Id. Section 372(c)(8) provides in part:
If the Judicial Conference concurs in the determination of the council, or makes its
own determination, that consideration of impeachment may be warranted, it shall so
certify and transmit the determination and the record of proceedings to the House of
Representatives for whatever action the House of Representatives considers to be
necessary.
Id.
100. Id. § 372(c)(10).
101. Id. § 372(c)(1).
102. The Constitution states that a party convicted following impeachment "shall nevertheless
be liable and subject to indictment, Trial, Judgment and Punishment according to law." U.S.
CoNsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
103. The Ninth Circuit rejected the claim that the Constitution immunizes a sitting federal
judge from criminal prosecution prior to removal by impeachment. United States v. Claiborne,
727 F.2d 842 (9th Cir. 1984); accord United States v. Hastings, 681 F.2d 706, 709-11 (11 th Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1203 (1983); United States v. Isaacs, 493 F.2d 1124 (7th Cir.) (per
curiam), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974). Scholars have debated whether impeachment and
conviction must precede prosecution in a court of law. Some argue that imprisonment prior to
impeachment constitutes removal in violation of the impeachment clause. These commentators
support a stay of execution of sentence or immunity prior to removal. See, e.g., Robert S. Catz,
Removal of Federal Judges by Imprisonment, 18 RUTGERS L.J. 103 (1986); Steven W. Gold,
Note, Temporary Criminal Immunity for Federal Judges: A Constitutional Requirement, 53
BROOKLYN L. REV. 699 (1987). Hamilton asserted, "The President of the United States would be
liable to be impeached, tried, and, upon conviction of treason, bribery, or other high crimes or
misdemeanors, removed from office; and would afterwards be liable to prosecution and punish-
ment in the ordinary course of the law." THE FEDERALIST No. 69 (Alexander Hamilton), supra
note 10, at 416. Hamilton's assertion suggests impeachment and conviction should precede
prosecution.
104. It is unclear exactly what "removal" means. Some commentators argue that the 1980 Act
unconstitutionally authorizes removal of a federal judge because the Act sanctions removal of a
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Article III judges hold their office "during good Behaviour."'0 5 The relation-
ship of "good Behaviour" to the impeachment standard of "high crimes and
misdemeanors"'' 0 6 has been extensively debated. If "good behaviour" describes
life tenure, subject to impeachment, then behavior that is "not good" must be
limited to impeachable conduct. Alternatively, the "good behaviour" clause
may not be linked exclusively to impeachment, but may establish an additional
standard of conduct to which Article III judges are held. Behavior that is "not
good" does not necessarily rise to the level of an impeachable offense. Thus,
judges engaging in "not good" behavior less egregious than an impeachable
offense could be subject to sanction. 10 Proponents of this theory are divided on
whether the good behavior standard allows removal of an Article III judge by
methods other than impeachment, or merely permits discipline for misbehavior
not rising to the level of "high crimes and misdemeanors. '"108
The debates at the Constitutional Convention strongly suggest that "good
Behaviour" was intended to describe life tenure subject to impeachment, and
was not intended as a separate standard of conduct authorizing removal or
discipline by a means other than impeachment. Governor Edmund Randolph's
Virginia Plan provided for the establishment of a national judiciary to hold
offices "during good behaviour.' 0 9 At the time, several state constitutions also
provided for judicial tenure during good behavior." 0 Charles Pinckney of
South Carolina, debating a proposal to exclude members of the First Congress
judge's caseload. See, e.g., Lynn A. Baker, Note, Unnecessary and Improper: The Judicial Coun-
cils Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980, 94 YALE L.J. 1117, 1132 (1985).
There is authority suggesting that removal must be viewed more narrowly. The Supreme Court
has observed that Congress may lighten judicial duties, as long as the judge is paid and remains in
office. Booth v. United States, 291 U.S. 339, 351 (1934). More recently, a federal appeals court
observed that a retired judge continues to hold office and receive compensation even if he or she is
incapable of performing any services. Adams v. Commissioner, 841 F.2d 62, 64-65 (3d Cir. 1988).
105. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
106. U.S. CoNsT. art. II, § 4; see also BERGER, supra note 11, at 123-24 (discussing the use of
the "high crimes and misdemeanor" standard in the attempted impeachment of Justice Douglas).
107. Professor Raoul Berger is the leading proponent of this argument. Berger points out that
at English common law, an official guilty of misbehavior not rising to the level of high crimes and
misdemeanors could be removed by a writ of scire facias. See BERGER, supra note 11, at 127.
108. Berger argues that the "good behavior" clause authorizes removal by means other than
impeachment. Id. at 122-80. In contrast, Judge Harry Edwards argues that impeachment is the
only constitutional method of removal. However, Judge Edwards concludes that the "good behav-
ior" clause permits discipline by nonimpeachment means, as long as removal is not an option.
Harry T. Edwards, Regulating Judicial Misconduct and Divining "Good Behavior" for Federal
Judges, 87 MICH. L. REV. 765 (1989).
109. 1 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 24, at 21.
110. For example, the Virginia Constitution of 1776 provided that "Judges of the Supreme
Court of Appeals, and General Court, Judges in Chancery, Judges of Admiralty .. . [are] to be
commissioned by the Governor, and [are to) continue in office during good behavior." DELAWARE
DECLARATION, supra note 9, at 133. The Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 provided for tenure
during good behavior, but also provided for removal by the governor upon address by both houses
of the legislature. Id. The Maryland Constitution of 1776 provided that judges "shall hold their
commissions during good behaviour, removable only for misbehavior, on conviction in a Court of
law." Id.; see also Ziskind, supra note 1, at 142.
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from government office, referred to the offices of the judiciary department as
continuing "for life." '111 This standard contrasted with the fixed terms estab-
lished for the President, the Vice-President, and members of Congress. While
considering impeachment of the Executive, Rufus King of New York
commented:
It had been said that the Judiciary would be impeachable. But it should
have been remembered at the same time that the Judiciary hold their
places, not for a limited time, but during good behaviour. It is necessary
therefore that a forum should be established for trying misbehaviour ....
[The Executive] ought not to be impeachable unless he hold his office during
good behaviour .... "I
King later remarked that for those who hold office for life, "impeachments are
proper to secure good behaviour." 1 3
The link between good-behavior tenure and impeachment is compelling in
light of the Framers' desire to protect judicial independence. Given the Fram-
ers' significant and well documented interest in judicial independence, it
hardly seems likely the Framers intended to undermine independence by mak-
ing it easier to remove judges. The very language of "good behavior" is the
most persuasive evidence that it was not intended as a separate standard of
conduct. The ambiguity inherent in "good behavior" would provide a basis for
almost unlimited legislative control over the judiciary. Hamilton stressed the
importance of ensuring that removal would never be an easy process. In the
Federalist Papers he wrote:
The want of a provision for removing the judges on account of inability
has been a subject of complaint. But all considerate men will be sensible
that such a provision would either not be practiced upon or would be more
liable to abuse than calculated to answer any good purpose. The mensura-
tion of the faculties of the mind has, I believe, no place in the catalogue of
known arts. An attempt to fix the boundary between the regions of ability
and inability would much oftener give scope to personal and party attach-
ments and enmities than advance the interests of justice or the public good.
The result, except in the case of insanity, must for the most part be arbi-
trary; and insanity, without any formal or express provision may be safely
pronounced to be a virtual disqualification.""
111. 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 24, at 491.
112. 2 id. at 66-67.
113. 2 id. at 68. Both Alexander Hamilton and John Rutledge of South Carolina unsuccessfully
proposed amendments to the judicial article which would have specifically provided for removal of
judges by impeachment. 3 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 24, at 625; 2 id. at 367. Toward
the end of the Convention, James Mason complained, "No mode of impeaching the Judges is
established." 4 Id. at 56. The Convention never addressed this point further. Ziskind suggests that
there is a "legitimate textual question" as to whether judges were subject to the impeachment
provisions. Ziskind, supra note I, at 151. She concludes that rejection by the Constitutional Con-
vention of removal by direct address and state constitutional practice at the time compel the
conclusion that federal judges were subject to the Article II impeachment clause. Id.
114. THE FEDERALIST No. 77 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 10, at 474. Hamilton's state-
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Hamilton preferred to endure some incompetency on the bench rather than
jeopardize judicial independence.
The delegates explicitly rejected removal by address because it compromised
judicial independence. John Dickinson of Delaware moved to amend the judi-
cial article to insert, after the words "good Behaviour," the words "provided
that they may be removed by the Executive on the application by the Senate
and House of Representatives."' 15 The British system and several state consti-
tutions permitted removal by address." 6 Governor Morris of Pennsylvania op-
posed the motion because he thought it contradictory for the judges to hold
office during good behavior, yet be removable without a trial." 7 James Wilson
of Pennsylvania feared that judges "would be in a bad situation if made to
depend on every gust of faction which might prevail in the two branches of our
government.""'  Randolph opposed the motion, arguing that it would
"weaken[] too much the independence of the Judges."'1 9 The motion was de-
feated 7-l.2 °
Constitutional history is replete with references to impeachment as the sole
means of removal of judges. Hamilton's comments in the Federalist Papers
probably are the best known:
The precautions for their responsibility are comprised in the article re-
specting impeachments. [Judges] are liable to be impeached for malconduct
by the House of Representatives and tried by the Senate; and, if convicted,
may be dismissed from office and disqualified for holding any other. This is
the only provision on the point which is consistent with the necessary inde-
pendence of the judicial character, and is the only one which we find in our
own Constitution in respect to our own judges.121
The Antifederalists also believed the Constitution limited removal to
impeachment. 12
ment regarding "virtual disqualification" for insanity has baffled many commentators. Some of
them conclude that this statement supports removal by means other than impeachment. See BER-
GER, supra note I1, at 139. At most, Hamilton's comment simply distinguishes disability from
misconduct. It has always been doubtful whether impeachment is appropriate for disability, al-
though Judge John Pickering allegedly was impeached while he was insane. See Feerick, supra
note 12, at 27.
115. DELAWARE DECLARATION, supra note 9, at 138.
116. See Ziskind, supra note I, at 138-47.
117. Id. at 150.
118. 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 24, at 429.
119. 2 id.
120. 2 id. A number of states whose constitutions allowed removal by address voted against the
proposal. Ziskind, supra note I, at 151.
121. THE FEDERALIST No. 79 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 10, at 474.
122. According to the AntiFederalists:
The only clause in the constitution which provides for the removal of the judges from
office, is that which declares, that 'the president, vice-president, and all civil officers of
the United Sates, shall be removed from office, on impeachment for, and conviction of
treason, bfibery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors'. By this paragraph, civil
officers, in which the judges are included are removable only for crimes.
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The debates of the First Congress are important sources for interpreting the
Constitution.12s During the 1789 debate on the establishment of district
courts, Congressman William Smith of South Carolina declared, "[I]t will not
be easy to alter the system when once established. The judges are to hold their
commissions during good behavior, and after they are appointed, they are only
removable by impeachment."124 Elbridge Gerry, a Massachusetts delegate to
the Convention and future Vice-President, commented, "[Glentlemen have
said, that the Federal Judiciary will be disagreeable to the citizens of the
United States."' 25 After noting that few states protected the independence of
the judiciary to the extent of the federal system, Gerry added, "The judges of
the Federal court are to be removed only by impeachment and conviction
before Congress."' "
The Constitutional Convention impeachment debates focused primarily on
the President. Judicial removal was not a significant issue for the delegates
because independence for the judiciary, not accountability, was their priority.
The Framers did not discuss, and probably did not even contemplate, removal
of judges by the judiciary.1 27 Multiple means of removal would, however,
threaten judicial independence. It is precisely the "cumbersome" and limited
nature of the impeachment process which secures the independent judiciary
the Framers envisioned.' 28
BRUTUS No. 15, reprinted in part in 2 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION, supra note 8, at 160
[hereinafter BRUTUS].
123. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 724 n.3 (1986) (naming 20 members of the First
Congress who also participated in drafting the Constitution).
124. House of Representatives, The Judiciary, in 4 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION, supra note
8, at 146, 146.
125. Id. at 159.
126. Id. at 160. William Rawle wrote that "[a] commission granted during good behaviour can
only be revoked by [impeachment]." WILLIAM RAWLE, A VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES 210-19 (2d ed. 1829), reprinted in 2 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION, supra note
8, at 168, 170.
127. Professor Burke Shartel argues that removal is a proper judicial function-a necessary
and logical extension of the authority to administer and supervise the affairs of the judicial
branch. Burke Shartel, Federal Judges-Appointment, Supervision, and Removal-Some Pos-
sibilities Under the Constitution, 28 MIcH. L. REV. 870, 884 (1930). Shartel argues that the
impeachment power is merely a special exception to the separation of powers-a special legislative
power that does not negate the judiciary's power to remove its own members. Id. at 892.
128. Some commentators argue that the passage of the 1790 Act, discussed supra note 35 and
accompanying text, by the First Congress shows that the Framers intended to allow removal of
judges by means other than impeachment. See BERGER, supra note 11, at 150. The Act provided
that, upon conviction in federal court for bribery, a judge shall "forever be disqualified to hold any
office." See supra note 35. Professor Berger argues that "disqualification" is the equivalent of
removal. See BERGER, supra note 11, at 150; see also Michael J. Gerhardt, The Constitutional
Limits to Impeachment and Its Alternatives, 68 TEx. L. REV. 1, 31 (1989) (arguing that "im-
peachment is not the sole means of disqualifying federal judges from holding future offices"). The
1790 Act has never been applied to a federal judge. See Irving R. Kaufman, Chilling Judicial
Independence. 88 YALE L.J. 681, 702 n.127 (1979). The Supreme Court, interpreting a similar
statute applicable to Congress, saw the issue a little differently. The Court held'that the statute
itself did not operate to remove a senator. That action, the Court held, remained the sole preroga-
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B. Sanctions Other Than Removal
If impeachment is the only permissible means of removing a federal judge,
what disciplinary action, short of removal, is permissible? There are several
possible justifications for alternative disciplinary authority. First, the "good
behavior" clause potentially authorizes discipline, other than removal, against
judges who engage in "not good" behavior." 9 Supporters of this "hiatus" the-
ory claim that judges are accountable for bad behavior as long as removal
does not occur by means other than impeachment. 30 Second, the judicial
branch has, ostensibly, the inherent housekeeping authority to discipline
judges for misconduct. 3' This proposition accepts judicial discipline as a legit-
imate component of judicial administration. Third, discipline of judges (other
than Supreme Court Justices) may be authorized as a "necessary and
proper''132 extension of congressional authority under Article III, Section 1 to
establish inferior courts. 33
All three of these approaches fail to resolve the question of permissible dis-
ciplinary action. The "good behavior" hiatus theory does not justify judicial
discipline any more than it justifies judicial removal, because "good behavior"
defines tenure subject to impeachment, not an independent standard of con-
duct. The "housekeeping" theory and the "necessary and proper" theory pose
legitimate rationales for judicial-branch discipline. Unfortunately, they pro-
vide little insight into the permissible scope of disciplinary authority. The prin-
ciple of judicial independence necessarily limits judicial disciplinary authority.
For example, a disciplinary oversight process that requires a judge to submit
to fellow judges each judicial ruling or decision for review for bias or other
misconduct serves the judicial interest in a fair judiciary, but it clearly poses a
significant risk to impartial decision-making.
Judicial discipline also must not interfere with the congressional impeach-
ment power. Congress clearly has exclusive authority over the impeachment
process,3 including the definition of an impeachable offense. The judiciary
should not be in the business of disciplining impeachable offenses. Such disci-
pline would be without the public accountability built into the impeachment
tive of the Senate. Burton v. United States, 202 U.S. 344, 369-70 (1906). Under the Burton
rationale, the 1790 Act cannot be interpreted as operating independently of impeachment.
129. See, e.g., Edwards, supra note 108, at 775-77.
130. Id. at 775.;
131. See, e.g., Kastenmeier & Remington, supra note 30, at 767.
132. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 18.
133. "The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in
such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish." U.S. CONST.
art. Ill, § 1. Congress is expressly authorized to establish inferior courts, and has the power to
enact legislation "necessary and proper" to do so. Therefore, Congress must implicitly have the
authority to enact legislation ensuring smooth administration of such courts. Cf McCulloch v.
Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819) (interpreting the "Necessary and Proper" clause).
134. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2, cl. 5 (stating that the House shall have the sole power of
impeachment); U.S. CoNsT. art. 1, § 3, cl. 6 (stating that the Senate shall have the sole power to
try all impeachments).
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process. Therein lies the problem posed by the 1980 Act. It authorizes judi-
cial-branch discipline of the serious misconduct associated with impeachable
offenses. Consequently, judicial-branch discipline either becomes a substitute
for impeachment or an additional layer of accountability. Either result is
impermissible.
C. The Meaning of an Impeachable Offense
Impeachable conduct is not easily, or narrowly, defined.' 35 Treason is de-
fined in the Constitution as "levying War" against the United States, or giving
"Aid and Comfort" to its enemies. 131 Bribery is well understood by reference
to common and statutory law. The meaning of "other high crimes and misde-
meanors" has been the subject of considerable dispute. Constitutional history
clearly suggests that this standard should not be limited to indictable offenses,
but instead includes a broad range of abuses of public office. Any serious judi-
cial misconduct may be an impeachable offense. Alexander Hamilton referred
to impeachment of judges for "malconduct.' 13 7 Hamilton elaborated in The
Federalist:
The subjects of its jurisdiction are those offenses which proceed from the
misconduct of public men, or, in other words, from the abuse or violation of
some public trust. They are of a nature which may with peculiar propriety
be denominated POLITICAL, as they relate chiefly to injuries done imme-
diately to the society itself.138
The first provision proposed to the Constitutional Convention provided that
the Chief Executive "be removable on impeachment and conviction of mal-
practice or neglect of duty."13 9 This standard was intended to include various
acts constituting corruption or misuse of office. At times during the Conven-
tion, the terms "malversation" and "corruption" were interchanged with the
135. Impeachment was first used on this continent by the colonists as a means of checking
abuses of the monarchy. PETER C. HOFFER & N. E. HULL, IMPEACHMENT IN AMERICA, 1635-
1805, at 68 (1984). John Adams viewed impeachment as a means to prevent corruption. In 1776,
Adams wrote, "For Misbehaviour the grand inquest of the Colony, the House of Representatives,
should impeach before the Governor and Council." Id. at 65 (insertion omitted). Most of the new
states included impeachment provisions in their constitutions. Id. at 68. Impeachment provisions
in the early state constitutions were commonly based upon "mal-administration," "misbehaviour,"
or "corruption." In other words, impeachment provisions in early state constitutions envisioned
some form of misuse of official power. Pennsylvania specified "mal-administration," New Jersey
provided for impeachment upon "misbehavior," while North Carolina and Virginia included "cor-
ruption." Id. at 68-70. Impeachments were not uncommon in the post-Revolutionary War atmo-
sphere. Bribery, extortion, and misuse of funds were the most common impeachable offenses in the
new states, Id. at 79. Willful misconduct, as opposed to negligence, appeared to be a prerequisite
to finding impeachable conduct. Id.
136. U.S. CONST. art III, § 3, cl. 1.
137. THE FEDERALIST No. 79 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 10, at 474.
138. THE FEDERALIST No. 65 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 10, at 396.
139. 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 24, at 61. Hugh Williamson of North Carolina pro-




On August 6, 1787, The Committee of Detail reported out a revised execu-
tive article that provided an impeachment standard of treason, bribery, or cor-
ruption.14 1 This standard later was limited to "treason or bribery."'142 On Sep-
tember 8, debate centered on the scope of impeachable offenses.14 1 George
Mason objected to the limited standard of "treason or bribery," stating,
"Treason as defined in the Constitution will not reach many great and danger-
ous offences .... Attempts to subvert the Constitution may not be Treason..
"14 When Mason moved to add "maladministration" after "bribery,"
Madison objected, arguing that "[s]o vague a term will be equivalent to a
tenure during pleasure of the Senate. 45 Mason withdrew "maladministra-
tion" and substituted "other high crimes and misdemeanors against the
state. 1 46 This language passed 8-3 without any discussion of its meaning.1 47
Although the delegates did not specifically define impeachable offenses, Ma-
son's willingness to substitute "other high crimes and misdemeanors" for
"maladministration" and the vote in favor of this substitution suggest that the
delegates viewed this language as including corruption, neglect of duty, and
other offenses relating to maladministration. The delegates' experience with
state constitutional definitions of impeachable conduct that included "malad-
ministration," "misbehaviour," and "corruption" is further evidence the dele-
gates intended to include such conduct in the federal standard.14 8
140. As late as August 20, 1787, the standard reported was "neglect of duty, malversation, or
corruption." 2 id. at 337. During debate on the desirability of presidential impeachment, Colonel
Mason spoke of the need to punish "great crimes" and "corruption." I id. at 65. The special
nature of impeachment as a proceeding against abuses of office was noted by Governor Morris
who stated that for an impeachable offense, the President should "be punished not as a man, but
as an officer." I id. at 69.
141. 1 id. at 172.
142. 2 id. at 550.
143. 1 id. at 544-54.




148. James Wilson, a delegate to the Convention, described impeachment as "confined to politi-
cal characters, to political crimes and misdemeanors, and to political punishments." James Wil-
son, Legislative Department, Lectures on Law, in 2 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION, supra note 8,
at 166. The question of whether "high crimes and misdemeanors" is limited to only indictable
offenses seems settled by the verdict of history. Professor Berger argues that "high crimes and
misdemeanors" was a term of art in England defining purely political offenses. See BERGER, supra
note 11, at 59. However, neither English nor American practice has limited impeachment to in-
dictable offenses. See Feerick, supra note 12, at 7, 25-47. Many of the public officials that have
been brought before Congress for impeachment have argued that impeachment must be limited to
indictable offenses, but Congress has never been persuaded. See id. at 25-47. Rawle wrote that the
"involutions and varieties of vice are too many, and too artful to be anticipated by positive law."
RAWLE, supra note 126, at 168. Story concurred that "political offenses are of so various and
complex a character, so utterly incapable of being defined, or classified, that the task of positive
legislation would be impracticable, if it were not almost absurd to attempt it." Story, supra note
8, at 178.
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The "high crimes and misdemeanors" standard can be traced back to En-
glish impeachment law. It was used in England to refer to offenses involving
either criminal conduct, treason, or serious misuse of official position.149 Brit-
ish law considered "malversation" a "high misdemeanor."' 50 Although none of
the American state constitutions used the "high crimes and misdemeanors"
terminology, the convention delegates were likely to be familiar with the term.
The English impeachment of Warren Hastings, former Governor-General of
India, for "high crimes and misdemeanors" commenced on May 11, 1787,
three days before the delegates met in Philadelphia.1 51 Mason specifically re-
ferred to Hastings' impeachment when he protested limitation on the impeach-
ment standard to treason and bribery.'52 Mason argued, "Why is the provision
restrained to treason & bribery only? ... Hastings is not guilty of treason.' 53
While considering a provision requiring that a fugitive charged with treason,
felony, or high misdemeanor be returned to the state from which he fled, the
delegates struck the words "high misdemeanor" and inserted "other crime"
because of their concern that "high misdemeanor" had a "technical meaning
too limited."' 54 The delegates accepted the "high crimes and misdemeanors"
standard without discussion, which strongly suggests their familiarity with the
British formulation.
Serious abuses of judicial office constitute impeachable judicial conduct.
Blackstone described grounds for impeachment of a judge as including a delib-
erate disregard of the law.' 55 Regarding the perceived danger of judicial en-
croachment on legislative function, Alexander Hamilton wrote:
There never can be danger that the judges, by a series of deliberate usurpa-
tions on the authority of the legislature, would hazard the united resentment
of the body entrusted with it, while this body was possessed of the means of
punishing their presumption by degrading them from their stations."'
John Ewing Calhoun of South Carolina, during debate in the Senate in 1802,
opined:
We all fully and at once understand what is good behaviour in a judge, the
oath he takes and the very nature of his office show it; to act with justice,
integrity, ability and honor, and to administer justice speedily and impar-
tially, is good behaviour; if he acts contrary, it would be misbehaviour, and
149. Feerick, supra note 12, at 49.
150. Wilson, supra note 148, at 166.
151. Feerick, supra note 12, at 9.
152. 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 24, at 550.
153. 2 id.
154. 2 id. at 443.
155. For example, Blackstone argued that a jury instruction falsely "and corruptly given, (and
not the mere effect of mistake and misapprehension) .. .[a]nd any other gross misconduct of a
judge in the execution of his office" would be an impeachable offense. BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTA-
RIES, reprinted in part in 4 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION, supra note 8, at 181, 184.
156. THE FEDERALIST No. 81 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 10, at 485.
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the Constitution in that case has given a remedy by impeachment.157
The element of wilful misconduct runs through most early discussions of
impeachable offenses. James Iredell, during debate in the North Carolina Rat-
ifying Convention, forcefully argued that wilfulness is a prerequisite to im-
peachable conduct. Iredell averred:
God forbid that a man, in any country in the world, should be liable to be
punished for want of judgment .... Whatever mistake a man may make, he
ought not to be punished for it .... But if a man be a villain, and wilfully
abuse his trust, he is to be held up as public offender and ignominiously
punished. 58
The Antifederalists concurred on this point:
Errors in judgment, or want of capacity to discharge the duties of the office,
can never be supposed to be included in these words, high crimes and mis-
demeanors. A man may mistake a case in giving judgment, or manifest that
he is incompetent to the discharge of the duties of a judge, and yet give no
evidence of corruption or want of integrity. To support the charge, it will be
necessary to give in evidence some facts that will shew, that the judges com-
mitted the error from wicked and corrupt motives. 59
The records of the few successful judicial impeachments demonstrate that
impeachable judicial conduct encompasses a wide array of abuses of office. 160
157. Senate, Judiciary System, in 4 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION, supra note 8, at 167, 173-
74.
158. Debate in North Carolina Ratifying Convention, in 2 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION,
supra note 8, at 160, 165.
159. BRUTUS, supra note 122, at 160. Rawle, writing in 1829, commented, "If a judge should
be incapacitated by infirmity or age, or be otherwise, without any fault of his own, prevented from
performing his duties, he would not be a proper subject for removal by impeachment." RAWLE,
supra note 126, at 197. The question of whether impeachment is appropriate for cases of disability
and incapacity remains unresolved. There was some mention during the Constitutional Convention
that impeachment could be used in cases of incapacity. Hamilton ambiguously referred to insanity
as a "virtual disqualification." THE FEDERALIST No. 77 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 10 at
474. In treating presidential succession, the Constitution distinguishes between removal of the
President for death, resignation, or inability to discharge the powers and duties of office. U.S.
CONST. art. II § 1, cl. 6. The First Congress debated other forms of removing executive officers,
agreeing that "madness is no treason, crime or misdemeanor." BERGER, supra note 11, at 186
(quoting 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 487 (JOSEPH GALES ED.,1798)). Indeed, medical or physical disabil-
ity is inconsistent with the wilful misconduct necessary for impeachable conduct. Putting an in-
sane person on trial is also inconsistent with our law.
Judge John Pickering was impeached allegedly while he was insane. See Feerick, supra note 12,
at 27. During his impeachment proceedings, Congress extensively debated whether an insane per-
son could be impeached. Id. at 27-28. The Senate resolved the issue by deleting the language
"high crimes and misdemeanors" from the Articles of Impeachment and asking its members
merely to determine whether he was "guilty" of the acts alleged. See id.; HOFFER & HULL, supra
note 135, at 217. If judicial disability is not subject to impeachment, then the judiciary has
greater discretion and authority in dealing with such problems than it has in dealing with miscon-
duct that may be subject to impeachment.
160. The House has initiated more than 50 impeachment proceedings since adoption of the
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Several principles may be garnered from this historical overview. First, the
Framers believed it undesirable even to attempt to catalogue impeachable of-
fenses for fear of limiting congressional discretion. "High crimes and misde-
meanors" is a standard providing the broad flexibility needed by Congress to
define political offenses. Second, an impeachable offense cannot be tidily ana-
lyzed and defined precisely because it is largely a political determination, and
not one of positive law. Although impeachable offenses roughly may be defined
as some form of serious abuse of office, Congress defines impeachable offenses
in reference to political and historical standards.161
It is difficult, if not impossible, to attempt to distinguish categories of im-
peachable offenses from nonimpeachable offenses. While an isolated instance
of abuse of process may not rise to the level of an impeachable offense, a
pattern of such behavior certainly would, as would a single incident of an egre-
gious nature. Despite these interpretive difficulties, it is fair to say Congress
has acted to impeach and convict only in cases involving serious wilful
misconduct.
Congress' plenary authority over the impeachment process means that only
Congress can define exactly what constitutes an impeachable offense. This
point is critical when considering the separation of powers issues inherent in
judicial discipline. If Congress has exclusive authority over the impeachment
process, what authority does the judicial branch have over conduct which may
be impeachable? The Constitution explicitly grants the executive branch au-
Constitution. Only 15 officials have been impeached, and of those 15 only seven have been con-
victed and removed. Judge Walter F. Nixon, chief judge of the United States District Court for
the Southern District of Mississippi was the last judge removed following his conviction for per-
jury. See 135 CONG. REC. S14,633-39 (daily ed. Nov. 3, 1989). The impeachment of Justice
Samuel Chase was another attempt by Jefferson to remove a federalist judge. The Jeffersonian
leader of the Senate, William Giles of Virginia, argued that impeachment is "nothing more than
an enquiry, by the two Houses of Congress, whether the office of any public man might not be
better filled by another." Kaufman, supra note 33, at 705. The Senate rejected this assertion,
acquitting Chase on all eight Articles of Impeachment. See Feerick, supra note 12, at 29. West
H. Humphreys, a district court judge who went over to the Confederacy, was impeached and
convicted of treason and intentional, unlawful arrest of a citizen. Id. at 31-32. Judge Robert Arch-
bald, a United States circuit court judge and member of the Commerce Court, was impeached
and convicted for various acts involving influence peddling, some of which did not rise to the level
of indictable offenses. Id. at 39-43. Judge Ritter was acquitted of various acts of official miscon-
duct, including the acceptance of kickbacks and the unlawful practice of law, but was convicted
on the last article of impeachment charging that his specific offenses were such as "the reasonable
and probable consequences of his actions ... [are] to bring his court into scandal and disrepute, to
the prejudice of said court and public confidence in the administration of justice therein ... and to
render him unfit to serve as such judge." BERGER, supra note II at 99. Judge Alcee Hastings was
removed in 1989 for conspiring to obtain a bribe and perjury after he was acquitted of conspiracy
by a court of law. 135 CONG. REC. S13,782-88 (daily ed. Oct. 20, 1989).
161. The language of "great injuries" or "great offenses" appears repeatedly. James Iredell told
the North Carolina Convention that impeachment will occur only from "acts of great injury to the
community." Letters on Reorganization of the Supreme Court, in 4 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITU-
TION, supra note 8, at 163, 165-66. At the Constitutional Convention, Mason said that impeach-
ment was to be for "great crimes." 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 24, at 65.
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thority to prosecute impeachable offenses which may be crimes.162 The Consti-
tution provides no explicit authority for the judicial branch to act against con-
duct which may be impeachable. The 1980 Act purportedly authorizes
judicial-branch discipline over what may be impeachable offenses.
D. Misconduct Under The 1980 Act
Congress passed the 1980 Act in response to demands for greater judicial
accountability, amidst complaints that the impeachment process was too
"cumbersome" and antiquated to be considered an effective means of account-
ability. 63 Congress intended the Act to "supplement" the little-used impeach-
ment process.1 64 Congress clearly intended discipline under the Act to address
misconduct that may be impeachable. 16 5 For example, "an accusation that a
number of judges have been bribed in exchange for favorable opinions" is
given in the legislative history of the type of offense that might merit immedi-
ate referral to the Judicial Conference.1 66
The directives in the Act requiring the council or the Judicial Conference to
determine and refer to Congress what may be impeachable conduct are fur-
ther indications the Act empowers the judiciary to define and discipline im-
peachable conduct. The Act was intended to provide an "orderly procedure for
screening complaints of impeachable offenses and then forwarding them to the
House of Representatives for consideration. 1 61 7 The Act does not, however,
prohibit judicial-branch discipline if the allegations are referred to the House
of Representatives.
The principle disciplinary standard applied to federal judges is the ABA
Code of Judicial Conduct.166 The Code provides a laundry list of ethical "dos
and don'ts" for judges, including descriptions of obligations and abuses of of-
fice in matters of conflict of interest, appearance of impropriety, and political
activity.16 9 Generally, only wilful violations of the Code of Conduct are
grounds for discipline.1"O Wilful violations of the Code are subject to discipline
162. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
163. S. REP. No. 362, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4315, 4318. The
Senate Report claims that impeachment has "fallen into disuse because the legislature cannot
divert time from [its] ever increasing and relatively more important legislative assignments." Id.
164. Id. at 4317. The Report recommends the Act as a positive alternative to congressional
inaction. Id.
165. The House Report states that the disciplinary standard of "conduct that is inconsistent
with the effective and expeditious administration of the business of the courts [clearly] incorpo-
rates complaints regarding impeachable behavior [and] violations of the criminal law." H.R. REP.
No. 1313, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1980).
166. Id. at 12. This example illustrates "group criminal activity" subject to discipline under the
Act. Id.
167. Mitch McConnell, Reflections on the Senate's Role in the Judicial Impeachment Process
and Proposals for Change, 76 Ky. L.J. 739, 752 (1988). Senator McConnell also writes that the
Act was intended to provide the judiciary a means of keeping its own house in order. Id.
168. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (1990).
169. See id., Canons 2, 3, 5, & 7.
170. WHEELER & LEVIN, supra note 38, at 63.
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under the 1980 Act. This type of wilful misconduct is precisely the type of
conduct that may form the basis for impeachment.
A special committee of the Conference of Chief Judges promulgated proce-
dural rules that provide further insight into conduct actionable under the 1980
Act.17 ' The rules proscribe such conduct as "use of the judge's office to obtain
special treatment for friends and relatives, acceptance of bribes, improperly
engaging in discussions with lawyers or parties to cases in the absence of rep-
resentatives of opposing parties, and other abuses of judicial office.' 1 72 Clearly,
the Act contemplates discipline for only serious acts of misconduct-the same
types of acts that may constitute impeachable offenses.
By granting disciplinary authority to the judicial councils and Judicial Con-
ference, the Act essentially establishes "concurrent" jurisdiction between the
judicial branch and the legislative branch over impeachable conduct. Only
Congress may remove a judge for impeachable conduct. The judiciary, how-
ever, may discipline a judge for the very same conduct. The legitimacy of this
concurrent jurisdiction must be assessed under principles of separation of
powers.
IV. JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS
The purposes of the separation of powers are to prevent tyranny and to as-
sure efficient operation of government.17 The Framers' attention to judicial
independence is directly related to the prevention of tyranny.1 7 4 Constitutional
history highlights the importance of an independent judiciary to the proper
functioning of government.1 7 However, the Framers never specifically consid-
171. See FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, ILLUSTRATIVE RULES GOVERNING COMPLAINTS OF JUDI-
CIAL MISCONDUCT AND DISABILITY (1986) [hereinafter ILLUSTRATIVE RULES].
172. Stephen B. Burbank, Politics and Progress in Implementing the Federal Judicial Disci-
pline Act. 71 JUDICATURE 23 (1987).
173. Many of the delegates to the Constitutional Convention were well acquainted with the
work of Baron de Montesquieu. Montesquieu distinguished between the legislative, executive, and
judicial branches and argued for the need to delineate power between the branches to avoid tyr-
anny. See CHARLES DE SECONDAT MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS 152 (Nugent ed., 1823)
(originally published in 1748). The state constitutions following the American Revolution relied
heavily upon separation of powers principles. See GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE
AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at 548-52 (1969). Madison wrote, "The accumulation of all
powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many,
and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of
tyranny." THE FEDERALIST No. 47 (James Madison), supra note 10, at 301.
174. Montesquieu stated that "there is no liberty, if the judiciary power be not separated from
the legislative and executive powers." See STORY, supra note 8, at 200. Hamilton referred to the
judiciary as "beyond comparison, the weakest of the three departments of power" and argued that
"all possible care is requisite to enable it to defend itself against" the attacks of the other two
departments. THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 10, at 465-66.
175. The Supreme Court has trod an uneven path through formalism and functionalism in
separation of powers analysis. In Myers v. United States, the Court held that the President has
complete authority to remove subordinates performing executive functions. 272 U.S. 52, 119-25
(1926). Faced with President Roosevelt's attempt to remove a member of the Federal Trade Com-
mission without cause, however, the Court held that Congress could limit presidential removal of
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ered whether the judiciary may remove or discipline its own members.
The Supreme Court recently has decided two cases relevant -to judicial-
branch disciplinary authority. In Morrison v. Olson' the Court rejected
"rigid categories" of analysis in separation of powers cases in favor of a bal-
ancing test directed toward determining whether congressional "restrictions
are of such a nature that they impede the President's ability to perform his
constitutional duty."' 77 The Court in Morrison concluded that the key ques-
tion in separation of powers cases is whether the activities of one branch inter-
fere with the ability of a coordinate branch to perform its constitutional
functions.'78
those officers who were not "purely executive" but who also performed "quasi-legislative" and
"quasi-judicial" functions. Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 624, 628, 629,
631 (1935). The Court gave no guidance on distinguishing such officials or why such distinctions
were relevant. The outcome of the case was correct, however. The opinion implicitly recognized
that the separation of powers is not threatened by protecting the independence of certain officials
from arbitrary executive removal so long as the President's ability to perform constitutionally
assigned functions is not jeopardized. Id. at 629-30. In Immigration & Naturalization Service v.
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983), the Court struck down a House of Representatives' legislative veto
of the Attorney General's decision to suspend the deportation of an alien, characterizing it as a
"legislative act" requiring bicameralism and presentment under the Constitution. id. at 951. The
Court failed to convincingly explain why the legislative veto was a legislative act any more.than
actions by other branches that have the "effect of altering the legal rights, duties, and relations of
persons." Id. at 952. The opinion rests on the assumption that any acts taken by the legislature
necessarily are "legislative acts" subject to the bicameralism and presentment requirements with-
out considering whether the legislative veto was inconsistent with the purposes of the separation of
powers. Subsequently, in Bowsher v. Synar, the Court obscured the real issue of whether the
Congress can insulate certain arguably executive decisions from presidential control. 478 U.S. 714
(1986). Bowsher involved a challenge to the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act, which authorized the
Comptroller General to calculate percentage budget reductions contained in the Act. However,
the Court focused on whether the Comptroller General was independent of Congress. Id. at 727-
32. The Court relied upon a rigid and simplistic interpretation of the statute allowing Congress to
remove the Comptroller General for cause by joint resolution (subject to presidential veto) and
found that the Comptroller General was an agent of Congress and could not constitutionally exer-
cise the budget reduction functions. Id. at 732-33. The Court considered the very existence of the
removal provision dispositive, despite .the Comptroller General's historical independence. Id. at
773 (White, J., dissenting). By contrast, in Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, the Court
opted for a more flexible separation of powers analysis. 433 U.S. 425 (1977). The Court focused
"on the extent to which [a provision of law] prevents the Executive Branch from accomplishing its
constitutionally assigned functions." Id. at 430. The Court returned to this test more than ten
years later in Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988). See infra notes 176-82 and accompanying
text (describing and analyzing Morrison).
176. 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
177. Id. at 691 (upholding provisions of the Ethics in Government Act, 28 U.S.C.§§ 591-599
(1988)). The Court in fact discounted the "quasi-legislative, quasi-judicial" distinctions made in
Humphrey's Executor as an inadequate means of ensuring that the purpose of separation of pow-
ers is achieved, i.e., that one branch does not interfere with the constitutionally assigned functions
of another branch. Id. at 689-90.
178. Id. at 695. Justice Kennedy recently suggested that this balancing test is appropriate only
when the power at issue "was not explicitly assigned by the text of the Constitution" to one of the
branches of government. See Public Citizen v. United States, 491 U.S. 440, 484 (1989) (Kennedy,
J., concurring). Kennedy argued that the balancing test was inappropriate for a power expressly
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The Morrison decision also considered the permissible scope of activities of
Article III judges. One challenge made to the independent counsel provisions
contained in the Ethics in Government Act 17 9 was to the authority of the Spe-
cial Division, a "court" comprised of Article III judges, to select independent
counsel, define the counsel's area of inquiry, and ultimately terminate the posi-
tion when the counsel's work is completed. 80 The Court stated a general rule
that "executive or administrative duties of a nonjudicial nature may not be
imposed on judges holding office under Art[icle] III of the Constitution." ''
The purpose of this rule was to protect the independence of the judiciary and
ensure that judges did not "undertake tasks that are more properly accom-
plished by those branches.' 82
Mistretta v. United States,"' decided the following term, provided addi-
tional insight into the Court's view of the permissible scope of activities of
Article III judges. Mistretta involved an unsuccessful challenge to provisions
of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984.'8" The Sentencing Reform Act created
an independent United States Sentencing Commission, comprised in part of at
least three Article III judges, and charged with promulgating sentencing
guidelines.83 The constitutional issues raised in Mistretta included whether
Congress had improperly delegated legislative authority to fix sentences, and
whether delegating rulemaking authority to the judicial branch and assigning
the extra-judicial duties to Article III judges violated the separation of powers
doctrine.
The Court quickly disposed of the delegation challenge, noting the well es-
tablished rule that Congress may obtain "the assistance of its coordinate
Branches," as long as Congress lays down an "intelligible principle" of direc-
tion.' 86 The Court found the Act provided ample legislative guidance to the
Sentencing Commission.' 87
In addressing the separation of powers challenges, the Court, following
Morrison, relied upon a "flexible understanding of the separation of pow-
ers," 88 emphasizing that the Court has not hesitated to "strike down provi-
sions of law that either accrete to a single branch powers more appropriately
diffused among separate branches or that undermine the authority and inde-
assigned by the Constitution. He asserted that the Court would not accept "'any intrusion" by one
branch into functions explicitly assigned to another branch. Id. at 484. Justice Kennedy mentioned
Chadha as an example of the latter analysis. Id. His analysis suggests judicial-branch discipline of
impeachable offenses would be impermissible.
179. 28 U.S.C. §§ 591-99 (1988).
180. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 677.
181. Id. (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 123 (1976)).
182. Id. at 680-81.
183. 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
184. 18 U.S.C. § 3551 (1988).
185. 28 U.S.C. § 991 (1988).
186. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 372.
187. Id. at 379.
188. Id. at 381.
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pendence of one or another coordinate Branch." 19
The Court focused on two specific factors relevant to judicial separation of
powers: ensuring the independence of the judicial branch, and assuring that
the judicial branch is not "assigned or allowed" tasks that are more properly
accomplished by "[other] branches." 19 0 A guiding principle is whether the du-
ties assigned are "appropriate to the central mission of the Judiciary."'' In
concluding that judicial promulgation of sentencing guidelines was permissi-
ble, the Court noted other legitimate examples of judicial rulemaking. 92 The
Court emphasized that the inquiry into permissible judicial responsibilities
must focus on the "unique aspects of the congressional plan at issue and its
practical consequences in light of the larger concerns that underlie Article
III."' ° The Court concluded that judicial promulgation of sentencing guide-
lines did not, as a practical matter, undermine judicial independence or imper-
missibly expand judicial power.' 94
Notably, the Court in Mistretta had problems with the argument that the
judiciary's involvement in the formulation of sentencing policy taints the im-
age of impartiality and nonpartisanship so critical to its credibility. The Court
was persuaded, however, that the judiciary's integrity was not tarnished be-
cause promulgating sentencing policy was primarily a "neutral endeavor and
one in which judicial participation is peculiarly appropriate.'1 95
Both Morrison and Mistretta are relevant to the question of judicial disci-
pline for several reasons. First, the Court recognized that separation of powers
issues ultimately must be resolved by references to the purposes of the consti-
tutional structure. Questions on the permissible scope of activities of Article
III judges therefore must be answered, in part, by whether the activity under-
mines the independence of the judiciary. Second, the congressional assignment
of functions to the judicial branch must be analyzed by examining whether the
assignment encroaches upon the prerogatives of another branch or interferes
with the key function of the judiciary-the impartial administration of justice.
Finally, the Court has applied these criteria in a flexible manner and appears
willing to uphold a variety of congressional innovations on the use of Article
III judges so long as these activities do not compromise independence or pre-
sent encroachment problems.'96 The willingness of the Morrison Court to up-
189. Id. at 382.
190. Id. at 383 (quoting Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988)).
191. Id. at 388.
192. For example, the Court noted the judicial councils' authority to "make all necessary or-
ders for the effective and expeditious administration of the business of the courts." Id. at 388
(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 332 (1939)).
193. Id. at 393 (quoting Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 857
(1986)).
194. Id. at 396-97.
195. Id. at 407.
196. One longstanding example is the Court's exercise of "legislative" power to promulgate
Rules of Civil Procedure. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1988). Contra Martin H. Redish, Separation of
Powers, Judicial Authority and the Scope of Article III: The Troubling Cases of Morrison and
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hold the creation of an independent counsel to perform clearly executive func-
tions of investigation and prosecution exemplifies the Court's rejection of
formalism in favor of functionalism. 97
The Court's functionalist analysis, while perhaps an improvement on the
formalist approach, presents its own problems as applied to separation of pow-
ers issues. If the principal criterion is whether the statute in question prevents
the designated branch from performing its constitutionally assigned functions,
then the only clear lines of demarcation are those functions explicitly granted
by the Constitution to the respective branches.198 A functionalist analysis
therefore must consistently consider whether the purposes of the separation of
powers are being served or hindered by the activity in question. Without active
consideration of these principles, a functionalist analysis of separation of pow-
ers may be reduced to an ad hoc evaluation of the practical effectiveness of a
proposed innovation in achieving the purpose intended by Congress.
V. THE OVERRIDING SIGNIFICANCE OF INDEPENDENCE TO THE JUDICIARY
The importance of institutional independence of the judicial branch is clear
from the constitutional history discussed in Section II of this Article. However,
the principle of an independent judiciary extends beyond the structural inde-
pendence of the judicial branch. Independence of the judicial branch does not
exist for its own sake. Independence secures the impartial, personalized deci-
sion-making that forms the basis of common law adjudication. Impartial deci-
sion-making results only from the independence of each individual judge who
renders a decision. The guarantee of independence therefore is meaningless if
not extended to individual judges." The constitutional guarantees of life ten-
ure and undiminished compensation secure the independence of individual
Mistretta, 39 DEPAUL L. REv. 299 (1989)(arguing that such uses of judges constitutes an imper-
missible assignment of nonadjudicating functions to the judiciary).
197. The Court in deciding Morrison most likely grappled with the possible ramifications of
striking down the Independent Counsel Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 591-598 (1988): the perception that
high-ranking executive officials in effect would be immune from criminal prosecution for criminal
acts committed in furtherance of presidential policy, leaving impeachment as the sole constitu-
tional sanction. See Dean Alfange, Jr., The Supreme Court and the Separation of Powers: A
Welcome Return to Normalcy?. 58 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 668, 742 (1990).
198. Under Justice Kennedy's approach, these explicitly defined functions would not be subject
to balancing; rather, they would be strictly enforced. See supra note 178.
199. Blackstone recognized that the notion of judicial independence includes structural and in-
dividual components. Blackstone wrote:
In America ... [the judiciary] is rendered absolutely independent of, and superior to
the attempts of both, to control, or crush it: First, by the tenure of office, which is
during good behavior ..... Secondly, by the independence of the judges, in respect to
their salaries, which cannot be diminished. Thirdly, by the letter of the constitution
which defines and limits the powers of the several co-ordinate branches of the govern-
ment; and the spirit of it, which forbids any attempt on the part of either to subvert
the constitutional independence of the others.
BLACKSTONES COMMENTARIES, supra note 155, at 182.
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judges from political pressure. 00 Story wrote that:
even with the most secure tenure of office, during good behaviour, the dan-
ger is not that the judges will be too firm in resisting public opinion and in
defence of private rights or public liberties; but, that they will be too ready
to yield themselves to the-passions, and politics, and prejudices of the day."'1
The Supreme Court, as recently as 1982, recognized the need to protect the
independence of individual judges, declaring, "The guarantee of life tenure
insulates the individual judge from improper influences not only by other
branches but by colleagues as. well, and thus promotes judicial
individualism." 20 2
The modern federal judiciary is an intricate network of connected courts,
organized under an umbrella of centralized management. However, this popu-
lar perception of the federal judiciary as a form of unified bureaucratic model
has contributed to the acceptance of a disciplinary structure within the admin-
istrative framework. 3 The perception of the judiciary as a bureaucracy also
has obscured the significance of protecting the independence of individual
judges.20'
200. Rawle wrote:
It is supposed to be the natural disposition of man, when placed above control, to
abuse his power, or, if no corrupt motives produce this consequence, there sometimes
are found a laxity, a carelessness, a want of sufficient exertion and deliberate judg-
ment in the exercise of it. On the other hand, if instead of availing himself of his own
knowledge and capacity, the judge submits to be governed by the opinions of others; if
he allows the desire to retain his office, the fear of giving offence, or the love of
popularity, to form any part of the ingredients of his judgment, an equal violation of
his trust is apparent.
RAWLE, supra note 126, at 196. Joseph Story likewise concluded that "there is everything to
convince us .. .that justice will ordinarily be best administered, where there is most indepen-
dence." STORY, supra note 8, at 200, 206.
201. STORY, supra note 8, at 206.
202. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 59 n.10 (1982).
The Court in Marathon Pipe also described the meaning of the "good behavior" clause, stating,
"The 'good Behavior' Clause guarantees that article III judges shall enjoy life tenure subject only
to removal by impeachment." Id. at 59.
203. See WHEELER & LEVIN, supra note 38, at 69-70.
204. Proponents of the 1980 Act argue that judicial branch discipline protects the judiciary's
independence precisely because it is the judiciary and not another branch imposing discipline.
Senator DeConcini stated, "This legislation protects the fragile independence of the judiciary
since the creation of a measure to investigate and discipline judges does not interfere with the
doctrine of separation of powers, nor the theory of judicial independence, if the judicial branch
has sole control over the proceedings." 126 CONG. REC. 28,092 (1980). The district court in Has-
tings v. Judicial Conf. of the United States, 593 F. Supp. 1371 (D.D.C. 1984), affd in part and
rev'd in part, 770 F.2d 1093 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 477 U.S. 904 (1986), in upholding the
constitutionality of the 1980 Act, similarly found that limitations may be placed on the indepen-
dence of individual judges "in order to assure the integrity and independence of the judicial
branch." Id. at 1379. Both these statements accept the concept of the judiciary as a bureaucracy
and entirely miss the point that the independence of the judicial branch can only be assessed in
relation to the independence of individual judges. But see Hastings v. Judicial Conf. of the United
States, 770 F.2d 1093, 1107 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Edwards, J., concurring) (asserting that "[i]f inde-
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The question of the constitutionality of federal judicial-branch discipline
must be answered in part by considering whether discipline short of impeach-
ment impermissibly interferes with the individual independence of federal
judges. The justifications for the disciplinary authority exercised by the legis-
lative and executive branches over its members do not equally support judicial-
branch discipline. First, the Constitution explicitly grants Congress the author-
ity to discipline its members.10 5 The Constitution grants no such authority to
the judiciary. 206 Second, the rationale for executive authority to discipline its
members does not apply to judicial-branch discipline.207 The extecutive branch
is by design a unified authority, whose members are subordinate to the Presi-
dent and are charged with helping the President carry out executive responsi-
bilities under the Constitution. The judicial branch, unlike the executive, is not
a unified, hierarchical power. Each judge is autonomous in constitutional func-
tion. The institutional unifier is the mechanism of appellate review, which as-
sures consistency in judicial precedent but provides no basis for discipline of
individual judges.
Certainly the judiciary has inherent authority to manage case flow and daily
administration of the courts. This authority enables the judiciary to perform
its constitutional function of deciding cases. The Supreme Court, in Chandler
pendent decisionmaking is to be protected, then individual judges must be shielded from coer-
cion"), cert. denied, 477 U.S. 904 (1986). Judge Edwards later revised his position somewhat,
concluding that non-impeachable "bad" behavior should be subject to judicial-branch discipline.
See Edwards, supra note 108, at 786. Judge Edwards also concluded that only Congress has the
authority to deal with impeachable offenses. Id. However, Judge Edwards assumes that there is a
readily definable category of bad behavior that does not rise to the level of impeachable conduct.
His assumption is inaccurate. See supra text accompanying notes 108, 129-34 (arguing that there
is no independent standard of bad behavior that does not rise to the level of impeachable conduct).
205. "Each House shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own
Members .... U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 1. The second clause of Section 5 also provides, "Each
House may ...punish its Members for disorderly Behavior, and, with the Concurrence of two
thirds, expel a Member." U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 5, cl. 2. Members of Congress generally are not
considered to be "civil officers of the United States" for purposes of the impeachment clause. See
Gerhardt, supra note 128, at 48-50. During the impeachment trial of Senator William Blount in
1798, Blount argued that the Senate lacked jurisdiction to try him because he was not a "civil
officer" of the United States. The Senate ultimately voted to dismiss, finding that Blount's juris-
dictional challenge was sufficient. See Feerick, supra note 12, at 26.
206. An argument can be made that the Framers recognized the need to explicitly authorize
congressional discipline of its members because, unlike the executive branch, each member of
Congress is equally empowered. The absence of an explicit constitutional provision authorizing
equally empowered judges to discipline fellow judges suggests that either the Framers never con-
templated *udicial-branch discipline or they considered such discipline as incompatible with the
independence of judges. See Gerhardt, supra note 128, at 50. The right of each house of Congress
to determine the qualifications of its members, and to punish and expel members can be traced to
the British system. See STORY, supra note 8, at 203-04.
207. Myers v. United States established the authority of the President to remove subordinates,
including officers who may be subject to impeachment. 272 U.S. 52 (1926). The Court found that
the President's responsibility to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed" made it essential
that the President be free to remove those officers charged with carrying out executive policy. See
id. at 133-34 (quoting U.S. CoNsT. art. 11, § 3).
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v. Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit, recognized the validity of limited
judicial management authority, but also cautioned that there is a "line defin-
ing the maximum permissible intervention consistent with the constitutional
requirement of judicial independence."20 8 Justice Douglas, in dissent, accepted
the authority of the courts to regulate case flow through the assignment, pro-
cess but argued ",there is no power under our Constitution for one group of
federal judges to censor or discipline any federal judge and no power to de-
clare him inefficient and strip him of his power to act as a judge."2 9
VI. THE 1980 JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE ACT
The 1980 Act attempts to walk the fine line of "permissible intervention. '210
The disciplinary standard set forth by the Act is conduct "prejudicial to the
effective and expeditious administration of the business of the courts."21 Thus,
all actions taken by either a judicial council or the Judicial Conference are
couched in the language of administrative necessity.
Certainly some degree of judicial-branch discipline is a legitimate compo-
nent of judicial administration. Judicial independence does not mandate that a
judge who persistently accumulates large backlogs or engages in profanity on
the bench be left alone to continue inappropriate conduct. The judiciary
clearly has a legitimate interest in protecting its credibility as an institution of
government. This legitimate judicial interest supports some degree of authority
within the judicial branch to rectify inefficiencies and public image problems
created by inappropriate judicial conduct.
The issue posed by the Act, therefore, is not whether the judiciary has any
inherent disciplinary authority. Instead, the essential issue is to what extent
the Constitution permits judicial-branch discipline as part of the judiciary's
legitimate authority to manage judicial business. Proponents of the Act argue
broad disciplinary authority is justified because it is impossible to distinguish
between permissible judicial administration and potentially impermissible judi-
208. 398 U.S. 74, 84 (1970). The types of appropriate administrative responsibilities discussed
by the Court included "when and where court shall be held, how long a case may be delayed in
decision, whether a given case is to be tried, and many other routine matters." Id. at 84-85. The
Court also approved as "reasonable, proper, and necessary" court rules that prohibit assignment
of further cases to a judge until that judge's backlog is reduced or eliminated. Id. at 85. These
mechanisms are a far cry from those contained in the 1980 Act, which allow reprimand or re-
moval of caseload as sanctions to be imposed for inappropriate conduct without limitation to the
appropriate corrective response. See 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(b)(B).
209. Chandler, 398 U.S. at 137 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Justice Douglas also argued that
"[o]nce a federal judge is confirmed by the Senate and takes his oath, he is independent of every
other judge." Id. at 136.
210. Chandler, 398 U.S. at 84; see also supra text accompanying note 208 (quoting Chandler
further).
211. 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(1). Similarly, the basis for action by a judicial council or the Judicial
Conference is to take such action "as is appropriate to assure the effective and expeditious admin-
istration of the business of the courts." Id. § 372(c)(6)(B).
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cial discipline."'
The judiciary may be faced with two types of judicial misconduct: minor
misconduct, not falling into the category of great offenses generally considered
as potentially impeachable conduct; and serious misconduct, which could prop-
erly be considered a basis for impeachment. Judicial self-regulation over minor
misconduct is advisable for two reasons. First, attention to such misconduct
legitimately fits within the judiciary's administrative concerns. Second, neither
Congress nor the Executive has any express constitutional authority to regu-
late judicial misconduct that is neither impeachable nor criminal.
Is the 1980 Act therefore a permissible means of regulating minor judicial
misconduct? First, the Act is unnecessary to the extent it authorizes discipline
of minor misconduct prejudicial to judicial business. The chief judge and the
councils already have authority under the 1939 Act to issue "all necessary
orders for the effective and expeditious administration of the business of the
courts within [their] circuit."2 Before the Act, minor misconduct was han-
dled informally, through discussions with concerned colleagues, or with the
chief judge of the circuit. Supporters of the Act argue that formalized proce-
dures serve the judge's due process interests as well as public accountability
concerns. The Act offers the investigated judge and the complainant an oppor-
tunity to petition for review of an adverse decision.2"4 It is questionable
whether public accountability of judges other than by impeachment or prose-
cution for crimes is constitutionally permissible, given the constitutional prior-
ity placed on independence.
Even assuming, for a moment, that public accountability for minor miscon-
duct is a constitutionally permissible goal, the Act only minimally serves the
goals of due process and accountability. The overwhelming majority of com-
plaints are handled by the chief judge without creation of a special committee
to investigate and report to the judicial council. Most of the claims handled by
the chief judge are concluded by dismissal without further review.21 5 Most
212. See generally Stephen B. Burbank, Procedural Rulemaking Under the Judicial Councils
Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 283, 301-04 (1982)
(detailing the legislative history behind the Act).
213. 28 U.S.C. § 332(d)(1).
214. Id. § 372(c)(10).
215. See, e.g., 1989 DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS
ANNUAL REPORT 93 [hereinafter 1989 ANNUAL REPORT]. Three hundred and four complaints
were filed in 1989. See id. The chief judges concluded 214 (79 %) of them. Id. Of these concluded
complaints, 204 were dismissed. Permissible grounds for dismissal under the Act are frivolity,
failure to conform to the statutory standard, or direct relation to the merits of the case out of
which the complaint arose. Id. at 92. Most of the complaints that were dismissed were based on
allegations of judicial bias or abuse of judicial power. Of the 58 complaints sent to the judicial
councils in 1989, 55 were disposed of by denying the complainant's petition for review. Id. at 93.
Only one recommendation of discipline, a public reprimand, resulted from judicial council actions.
On review of this recommendation, the Judicial Conference ordered private rather than public
reprimand. Id. at 92-96. Statistics from other years demonstrate similar patterns. See Edwards,
supra note 108, at 791; see also Collins T. Fitzpatrick, Misconduct and Disability of Federal
Judges: The Unreported Informal Responses, 71 JUDICATURE 282 (1988) (indicating that many
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complaints submitted pursuant to the Act are therefore disposed of in pre-
cisely the same manner as complaints submitted before the Act. They are pri-
vately resolved by the chief judge of the circuit without review.
Confidentiality of these proceedings and dispositions are protected. 16 Thus,
the Act does not really satisfy the goals of public accountability. Furthermore,
public accountability for minor judicial misconduct is simply inconsistent with
the principle of judicial independence. The Framers mandated life tenure for
judges, subject to impeachment for great offenses, precisely to reduce the po-
tential of corruption inherent in extensive public accountability. The true justi-
fication for judicial-branch discipline of minor misconduct is not to satisfy
public accountability, but to ensure that the judicial system operates efficiently
and effectively. Public accountability is not a permissible goal in disciplining
minor judicial misconduct.
The Act requires the chief judges and the judicial councils to devise elabo-
rate mechanisms for reviewing the conduct and decisions of their colleagues.
Although the overwhelming majority of complaints filed are either frivolous or
improperly based on the merits of a decision, 1' each complaint must be re-
viewed and investigated by the chief judge, the special committee of judges, or
the judicial council until disposition is made. Each disposition is subject to
further review. The very existence of a formalized complaint procedure tends
to encourage citizen complaints." The fact that nearly all of these complaints
are groundless underscores the fact that the Act effectively undermines one of
its intended purposes, the promotion of judicial efficiency, by imposing signifi-
cant investigative and administrative responsibilities on the judiciary to pro-
cess meritless complaints.
Nor does the mere existence of the Act assure that all misconduct matters
will be processed pursuant to the procedures mandated by the Act. If no for-
mal "complaint" is submitted, misconduct can still be handled outside the Act.
Many instances of alleged misconduct may simply never materialize in the
form of a "complaint" under the Act. 21 9 Institutionalizing judicial discipline
therefore fails to augment due process and public accountability, as intended
by the Act. The Act interferes needlessly with the institutional independence
complaints are resolved informally by the judiciary itself).
216. Rule 16 of the Illustrative Rules, promulgated by a special committee of the Conference
of Chief Judges, protects the confidentiality of all information relating to consideration of the
complaint. ILLUSTRATIVE RULES, supra note 171, at 49-52. Rule 17 provides for public availabil-
ity of the "docket sheet record" of "orders" of the chief judge regarding disposition of a complaint
and memoranda in support of such orders, but prohibits the release of the name of the judge
without the judge's consent when disposition is by the chief judge or by dismissal by the judicial
council. Id. at 52-53.
217. Frivolous complaints may comprise between 88% and 99.5% of the total complaints filed
in each circuit. See Edwards, supra note 108, at 790.
218. The number of complaints filed has increased substantially since passage of the Act. For
example, the number of complaints filed has increased from 177 filed in 1984 to 304 filed in 1989.
1989 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 215, at 93.
219. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 215, at 283.
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of the judiciary, particularly in regard to minor misconduct, because the legis-
lative scheme is both unnecessary and burdensome.
The Act also impermissibly threatens the independence of individual judges.
Impartial decision-making is the core constitutional function performed by the
judiciary. The Framers were very familiar with the subversion of impartial
decision-making that occurs when the executive or legislative branches are
able to exercise power over the tenure or compensation of judges. The Framers
were able to anticipate this threat to impartial decision-making and therefore
devised a structure designed to protect judicial independence. However, the
Framers did not anticipate the growth of a large judiciary where the manage-
ment of judicial business would become a necessary activity of the courts.
Consequently, they did not provide explicit protection against erosion of inde-
pendence from within the judicial branch. The principle of protecting impar-
tial decision-making is no less relevant because the threat comes from within
the judiciary itself.
The trend toward centralized management in the judiciary has, if anything,
only reinforced the need to protect independent decision-making. Coercion can
occur from within the judicial branch as well as from the actions of the other
branches. The contemporary, and perhaps misleading, view of the judiciary as
a bureaucracy has tended to emphasize conformity and uniformity over inde-
pendence. The 1980 Act only aggravates these tendencies by formalizing pro-
cedures that authorize judges to initiate complaints and pursue investigations
against fellow judges. The Act's problem is not that the judiciary should be
completely precluded from performing investigatory and prosecutorial func-
tions. The problem is that the Act assumes that judges can serve as complain-
ant, investigator, prosecutor, and judge over their colleagues without under-
mining judicial independence.2 20 The inherent fallacy of such an approach is
patently obvious. The judges exercising disciplinary authority generally will be
other judges within the same circuit as the judge under investigation. The con-
centration of such authority over a fellow judge is inconsistent with impartial
decision-making, even if the authority is not actually abused to intimidate or
harass a judge.221 The Framers rejected a proposal to try impeachments in the
Supreme Court in part because the power of impeachment should not be en-
trusted to a small number of persons. 222
The sanction powers under the Act, although not as drastic as impeach-
ment, are potent and can profoundly affect a judge. A judge under investiga-
tion pursuant to the Act may think twice before issuing a controversial opin-
220. See Gerhardt, supra note 128, at 77 (asserting that this assumption risks the independence
each judge must have in order to make decisions without fear of reprisal or harassment).
221. Judge Harry Edwards expressed concern in his Hastings concurrence that the Act might
be "misused to pressure or intimidate the nonconformist, the judge whose judicial style or legal
philosophy are [sic] repugnant to the majority of his or her colleagues." Hastings v. Judicial Conf.
of the United States, 770 F.2d 1093, 1107 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Edwards, J., concurring), cert. de-
nied, 477 U.S. 904 (1986).
222. THE FEDERALIST No. 65 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 10, at 398.
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ion. That "thinking-twice" risks impartial decision-making. Of course, in the
absence of the Act, a judge may still be the subject of an inquiry by the chief
judge and may still be subject to influences which may affect impartial deci-
sion-making.
The review opportunity in the Act offers the investigated judge some assur-
ance that the judge who is the subject of a formal complaint will not be at the
mercy of improper and private coercion regarding substantive decision-mak-
ing. The price of that assurance, however, is a process that poses a greater
threat to impartial decision-making because it requires the chief judge and the
councils to supervise the conduct of fellow judges. The Act, of course, does
nothing to protect the judge who may be the subject of an informal inquiry
outside the statutory process. Abuses can occur both with and without the Act.
The ostensible protection in the Act simply does not justify the threat to im-
partial decision-making posed by the statutory scheme.
Judicial self-regulation of serious misconduct is even more troublesome. Ju-
dicial self-regulation of serious misconduct is the true raison d'etre of the Act.
Congress clearly intended to require that the judiciary screen complaints for
impeachable conduct and to authorize an alternative to impeachment for seri-
ous judicial misconduct.22 3 The undermining of judicial independence dis-
cussed with regard to the Act's regulation of minor misconduct 224 applies as
well to regulation of serious misconduct.
Judicial self-regulation of serious misconduct presents significant additional
concerns, however. The responsibilities assigned to the judiciary by the Act
impair the impeachment function assigned to Congress in several ways. First,
the Act asks the respective judicial council or the Judicial Conference to de-
termine whether the judge has engaged in conduct for which impeachment
might be warranted, and asks it to forward such decision to the House of
Representatives. 2 5 Congressional delegations to a coordinate branch must be
accompanied by an "intelligible principle"226 to guide the delegation. Current
delegation doctrine indicates that Congress' authority to delegate is nearly un-
limited.227 However, the 1980 Act may be a rare example wfiere Congress
cannot provide an "intelligible principle" to guide congressional delegation be-
cause the definition of an impeachable offense is necessarily a political deter-
mination that must be left to Congress. Congress cannot legitimately delegate
a responsibility that, by its nature, requires congressional judgment. The judi-
ciary therefore lacks constitutional authority to decide what may be an im-
223. See supra notes 165-66 and accompanying text (discussing the House Report on the 1980
Act).
224. See supra pp. 35-36.
225. 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(8).
226. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989).
227. The Court has found impermissible delegations of legislative authority only twice, and not
since 1935. See Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935) (authority to prohibit the
transportation in interstate commerce of petroleum products produced in excess of state law);
Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (authority to promulgate and im-
pose codes of fair competition in order to rehabilitate an industry).
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peachable offense.
Congress is free, under the Act, to disregard a judicial determination that
impeachment may or may not be warranted. The fact that the judiciary's de-
termination is not binding, however, does not resolve the constitutional prob-
lem. If the Judicial Conference determines that an impeachable offense may
have been committed, Congress will make its own determination whether the
judge has engaged in impeachable misconduct. If, however, the Judicial Con-
ference concludes a judge has not engaged in impeachable conduct, Congress
is unlikely to evaluate the misconduct independently to determine whether
impeachment is warranted, because Congress intends that the judiciary screen
complaints for impeachable conduct. Thus, in many cases involving serious
misconduct, the judiciary's decision that the misconduct does not rise to the
level of an impeachable offense will, in fact, be conclusive.
The second reason the Act impairs the impeachment process is that it im-
permissibly authorizes judicial discipline over what may be impeachable of-
fenses.228 Self-regulation of serious judicial misconduct requires the unelected,
unrepresentative judiciary to perform a function reserved for Congress, the
branch of government most directly responsible to the people. The Constitu-
tion explicitly authorizes executive-branch prosecution of impeachable offenses
which may be crimes."' There is no constitutional support, however, for judi-
cial-branch jurisdiction over impeachable offenses.
Judicial disciplinary authority over impeachable offenses is impermissible
for two reasons. First, such authority is incompatible with judicial indepen-
dence. The Act legitimizes an additional layer of accountability for conduct
already governed. The Act allows both Congress to impeach and the judiciary
to discipline for the same misconduct. Congress certainly is free to impeach a
judge who has already been disciplined by the judiciary. Moreover, the Act
does not limit judicial disciplinary authority in the face of congressional im-
peachment proceedings.
Second, vesting control over serious judicial misconduct in the hands of
unelected life-tenured judges seriously affronts the principles of public ac-
countability inherent in the impeachment process. Whereas public accounta-
bility should not be relevant with regard to minor judicial misconduct, public
accountability is the critical issue when assessing judicial-branch discipline of
serious misconduct. Jurisdiction over serious public misconduct was vested in
Congress because the Framers believed the representatives of the people
should be the ones to evaluate the conduct of public officials.2"'
228. See supra note 134 and accompanying text (noting that Congress has exclusive authority
over the impeachment process).
229. See supra text accompanying note 102.
230. Hamilton argued that impeachment is a "method of NATIONAL INQUEST into the
conduct of public men .... If this be the design of it, who can so properly be the inquisitors for
the nation as the representatives of the nation themselves?" THE FEDERALIST No. 65 (Alexander
Hamilton), supra note 10, at 397. Hamilton doubted whether the Supreme Court "would possess
the degree of credit and authority" to sit as a court of impeachment. Id. at 398.
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The division of impeachment responsibility into investigation by the House
and trial by the Senate provides protection against one body serving both as
accuser and judge on questions of violation of the public trust.131 Judicial-
branch housekeeping jurisdiction should not extend to serious misconduct be-
cause this form of self-regulation is simply inconsistent with the public ac-
countability required for serious misconduct.32 The remedies explicitly au-
thorized by the Constitution-impeachment and prosecution-are vested in
public accountability. Even assuming that these remedies are not exclusive, a
permissible alternative remedy must reflect the public accountability principles
inherent in impeachment and prosecution. The sanctions authorized by the
Act, while substantial enough to deal satisfactorily with minor misconduct,
clearly do not provide sufficient means of disciplining serious misconduct. Rep-
rimand or temporary removal of caseload is an inadequate sanction for serious
misconduct. The Act allows the judiciary to insulate allegations of serious mis-
conduct from public scrutiny and severe sanction in the absence of aggressive
congressional oversight.
At this point, the argument of necessity must be made. For if the judiciary
has inherent authority to regulate minor judicial misconduct, but lacks the
authority to regulate serious judicial misconduct, then minor misconduct may,
in fact, be adequately regulated, while serious misconduct escapes regulation
by falling into the gap between legitimate judicial authority and congressional
inaction. The perceived need for replacing the impeachment process does not,
however, provide the constitutional authority to create an alternative in the
judicial branch which derogates the impeachment function, while impairing
the integrity of the judicial branch.
The Act attempts to allow Congress to "have its cake and eat it too." The
Act was intended to provide a substitute for impeachment, and to compensate
for congressional inactivity. Congress may well believe that the choice of im-
peachment or "doing nothing" is unsatisfactory for handling the majority of
cases of judicial misconduct. The Act ostensibly offers the option of dealing
with serious misconduct by means other than impeachment. But, by providing
231. Id. at 402.
232. The Act requires that "[e]ach written order to implement any action" by the judicial
council or the Judicial Conference be "made available to the public through the appropriate
clerk's office of the court of appeals for the circuit." 28 U.S.C § 372(c)(15). Rule 17 of the
Illustrative Rules requires a "docket sheet record of orders of the chief judge and the judicial
council and the texts of any memoranda supporting such orders and any dissenting opinions or
separate statements by members of the judicial council" be made available in the clerk's office
when final action is taken on the complaint, provided the action has been the subject of an order,
and the action taken was "public" action by the council. See ILLUSTRATIVE RULES, supra note
171, at 52-53. If private reprimand or censure is imposed, neither the judge's name, nor the text
of the reprimand will be publicly available. If the complaint is disposed of by the chief judge, or
dismissed by the council for .reasons other than mootness, the judge's name cannot be disclosed
without consent. Id. Information regarding a complaint referred to the Judicial Conference will be
disclosed only as may be ordered by the Judicial Conference. Id. Given the percentage of com-
plaints which are handled by the chief judge, or which may not result in an "order," public infor-
mation is minimal.
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a viable substitute for impeachment in all but the most egregious cases, Con-
gress almost certainly ensures that impeachment will fall into further disuse in
favor of judicial-branch discipline. The practical effect of the Act, therefore, is
to shift responsibility for disciplining serious misconduct from Congress to the
judiciary. Congress will increasingly rely upon judicial-branch discipline to re-
lieve Congress of what is perceived as the onerous chore of impeachment. The
value of impeachment as a constitutional check upon the judiciary is destined
to erode. The ultimate effect of that erosion will be the loss of public accounta-
bility for serious misconduct perpetrated by life-tenured judges. In effect, then,
the Act is self-defeating.
CONCLUSION
The 1980 Act unconstitutionally attempts to use the vehicle of judicial ad-
ministration to impose an extensive disciplinary system upon the judiciary.
While efficient judicial administration is clearly an appropriate goal, the exer-
cise of disciplinary authority must be confined to assure that judicial indepen-
dence is not undermined by burdensome and intrusive procedural
requirements.
The most serious problem with the Act is its authorization of judicial-
branch discipline for impeachable offenses. Because the Act shifts disciplinary
responsibility from Congress to the judicial branch of government, Congress
will increasingly rely upon judicial-branch discipline as a substitute for im-
peachment in all but the most egregious cases. The effectiveness of impeach-
ment as a check upon the judiciary will deteriorate, leaving the judiciary with
extensive disciplinary authority over its own members. While such authority
may leave the judiciary free from congressional interference, it jeopardizes the
principle of public accountability central to the impeachment function. The
public is entitled to expect accountability for serious judicial misconduct as
mandated by the Constitution. The vehicle for providing that accountability,
impeachment, is already in place.
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